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Introduction
This thesis is composed of three chapters on topics of theoretical economics
and applied theory. The first chapter analyzes the existence and implemen-
tation of a land division rule, defined through two properties: efficiency and
equal opportunity equivalence. It is a joint work with Antonio Nicolo` and
Andre´s Perea, and was published in SERIEs (2011), in the special issue in
honor of Salvador Barbera`, see Nicolo` et al. (2012). The second chapter
presents a citizen-candidate voting model with lobbying on a multidimen-
sional policy space, with salient issues. The third chapter investigates the
strategic behavior of colonizers in state capacity investment in non settle-
ment colonies, giving an explanation also to civil conflict outcomes after
independence.
Going more in detail, in the first chapter we look for a normative so-
lution to a land division problem that could be applied to different types
of disputes when the arbitrator has a very limited information about the
agents’ preferences, and market mechanisms are not available. The solution
must be fair and efficient under the constraint of the limited information
available to the arbitrator. To this scope, we propose to use the concept of
equal-opportunity equivalence defined by Thomson (1994). A land division
is equal-opportunity equivalent if each agent receives a parcel of the land who
makes her indifferent with respect to her best parcel of a given size µ,where
the size of the reference set must be the same for both agents. Existence of
the land division rule, uniqueness of utility levels are proved, along with a
mechanism to implement it, in which the preferences of the agents do not
need to be common knowledge. Moreover there is a unique µ for which the
rule exists, therefore µ is not a discretionary choice of the arbitrator.
The second chapter is devoted to the analysis of a citizen-candidate model
on a multidimensional policy space with lobbying, where citizens regard some
issues more salient than others. In equilibrium special interest groups that
lobby on less salient topics move the implemented policy closer to their pre-
ferred policy, compared to the ones that lobby on more salient issues. After
introducing two types of citizens, who differ with respect to the salience as-
signed to issues, pooling equilibria are found, where voters are not able to
offset the effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. This result is in
sharp contrast with previous work on unidimensional citizen-candidate mod-
els that predict the irrelevance of lobbying on the implemented policy, see
Besley and Coate (2001). In an extension of the model citizens are provided
with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to lobbies in order to
increase their power. With more than one lobby per dimension there are two
findings. First, under some conditions only the most extreme lobbies receive
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contributions. Second, the effectiveness of a lobby is maximized when the
salience of an issue is low in the population and high for a small group of
citizens.
The third chapter investigates the determinants of investment in state ca-
pacity in non settlement colonies. The results of this analysis overcome the
limitations of the framework provided by Acemoglu et al. (2001), whose the-
ory predicts that extractive institutions were set in non settlement colonies,
with no explanation for the wide heterogeneity of institutions in those colonies.
Roughly half of the colonies that became independent after 1945 suffered
costly civil conflicts thereafter. Empirical evidence suggests that the colo-
nizer’s investment in state capacity is one of the determinants of civil conflict
in ex colonies. A good state capacity, in the form of an efficient bureaucracy,
a working police force, an independent judiciary enforcing the rule of law,
fiscal capacity, prevented state failure and civil conflict, once independence
was achieved.
A theory is developed to study the strategic behavior of colonizers in choos-
ing investment in state capacity in the colony. High state capacity creates a
productive gain in the colonial economy, but as side effect it prevents civil
conflict in case of independence, and therefore increases the incentive of the
colony to fight for it. Colonizers decide to invest in state capacity comparing
its productivity gain with the increased military cost of maintaining power
when colonies aim at independence. The equilibrium investment in state
capacity depends on the matching between the identity of colonizer (a col-
onizer with a larger colonial empire will have a lower average military cost)
and the identity of the colony (the productivity gain depends on the presence
of natural resources, distance from the sea).
If the colonizer is forced to leave the colony for exogenous events, the lack of
state capacity, and the inefficiency of the decolonization process, determine
the civil conflict outcome after independence.
CONTENTS 7
Introduzione
Questa tesi e` composta di tre capitoli su argomenti di economica teorica e
teoria applicata. Il primo capitolo analizza l’esistenza e l’implementazione
di una regola per la divisione di terra, definita attraverso due proprieta`: effi-
cienza e equivalenza di pari opportunita`. E’ un lavoro coautorato con Antonio
Nicolo` e Andre´s Perea, ed e` stato pubblicato in SERIEs (2011), in un numero
speciale in onore di Salvador Barbera`, vedi Nicolo` et al. (2012). Il secondo
capitolo presenta un modello di voto con citizen-candidate, con lobby su uno
spazio politico multidimensionale, con argomenti salienti. Il terzo capitolo
studia il comportamento strategico dei colonizzatori nell’investimento in state
capacity nelle colonie di non insediamento, dando una spiegazione anche agli
effetti sui risultati di conflitto civile dopo l’indipendenza.
Andando piu` in dettaglio, nel primo capitolo cerchiamo una soluzione
normativa al problema di divisione di terra, che possa essere applicata a dif-
ferenti tipi di dispute, quando il negoziatore ha a disposizione informazioni
molto limitate sulle preference degli agenti, e meccanismi di mercato non
sono disponibili. La soluzione deve essere equa ed efficiente, sotto il vincolo
dell’informazione limitata disponibile al negoziatore. A questo scopo pro-
poniamo il concetto di equivalenza di pari opportunita`, definito da Thomson
(1994). Una divisione di terra e` equivalente in pari opportunita` se ogni agente
riceve un pezzo di terra che la rende indifferente rispetto al suo miglior pezzo
di una data area µ, dove l’area del pezzo di riferimento deve essere lo stesso
per entrambi gli agenti. L’esistenza di una regola per la divisione di terra,
l’unicita` dei livelli di utilita` vengono dimostrate, insieme ad un meccanismo
per implementarla, nel quale le preferenze degli agenti non sono informazione
comune. Inoltre c’e` un unico µ per quale la regola esiste, quindi µ non e` una
scelta discrezionaria del negoziatore.
Il secondo capitolo e` dedicato all’analisi di un modello di citizen-candidate
su uno spazio politico multidimensionale con lobby, nel quale i cittadini con-
siderano alcuni argomenti piu` salienti di altri. In equilibrio i gruppi di in-
teresse che fanno lobby sui temi meno salienti riescono a muovere la politica
implementata piu` vicino alla loro politica preferita, rispetto a gruppi che
fanno lobby su argomenti piu` salienti. Dopo aver introdotto due tipi di
cittadini, che differiscono per quanto concerne la salienza assegnata agli ar-
gomenti, troviamo equilibri pooling, nei quali i votanti non sono in grado di
annullare l’effetto dell’attivita` di lobby sulla politica implementata. Questo
e` risultato e` in forte contrasto con i precedenti lavori su modelli di citizen-
candidate unidimensionali che predicono l’irrilevanza dell’attivita` di lobby
sulla politica implementata, vedi Besley and Coate (2001). In una estensione
del modello, ai cittadini viene data la possibilita` di finanziare le lobby con
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donazioni monetarie per incrementare il loro potere. Con piu` di una lobby
per argomento ci sono due risultati. Primo, sotto alcune condizioni solo le
lobby piu` estreme ricevono contributi. Secondo, l’effettivita` di una lobby e`
massimizzata quando la salienza di un argomento e` bassa nella popolazione
e alta per un piccolo gruppo di cittadini.
Il terzo capitolo si occupa dei determinanti dell’investimento in state ca-
pacity nelle colonie di non insediamento. I risultati di questa analisi superano
i limiti del framework creato da Acemoglu et al. (2001), la cui teoria afferma
solo che istituzioni estrattive sono state promosse nelle colonie di non insedi-
amento, senza dare alcuna spiegazione alla grande eterogeneita` di istituzioni
in queste colonie.
Circa meta` delle colonie che diventarono indipendenti dopo il 1945 hanno
affrontato costosi conflitti civili successivamente. Evidenze empiriche sug-
geriscono che l’investimento del colonizzatore in state capacity sia uno dei
determinanti del conflitto civile nelle ex colonie. Una buona state capacity,
nelle forme di una burocrazia efficiente, una forza di polizia che funziona,
un sistema giudiziario indipendente, capacita` fiscale, hanno impedito il falli-
mento dello stato e il conflitto civile, una volta che l’indipendenza fu ottenuta.
Una teoria e` sviluppata per studiare il comportamento strategico dei coloniz-
zatori nello scegliere l’investimento in state capacity nella colonia. Una buona
state capacity crea un aumento di produttivita` nell’economia coloniale, ma
come effetto collaterale previene il conflitto civile in caso di indipendenza, e
quindi aumenta l’incentivo della colonia di combattere per essa. I colonizza-
tori quindi scelgono il livello di investimento in state capacity comparando
l’aumento di produttivita` con il maggiore costo militare per mantenere il
potere quando la colonia punta all’indipendenza. L’investimento in state ca-
pacity in equilibrio dipende dal matching tra l’identita` del colonizzatore (un
colonizzatore con un impero coloniale piu` vasto avra` un costo militare medio
piu` basso) e l’identita` della colonia (l’aumento di produttivita` dipende dalla
presenza di risorse naturali, distanza dal mare).
Se il colonizzatore e` forzato a lasciare la colonia a causa di eventi esogeni, la
mancanza di state capacity, e l’inefficienza del processo di decolonizzazione,





There are several situations where the solution of a land division problem
cannot be found using instruments like prices or monetary compensations.
This may be due to liquidity constraints; or to the psychological difficulty of
bringing a dispute down to monetary evaluations; or the division of the land
has to be in kind under the provisions of the law. According to the common
law, co-owners of land (or of any other assets) in case of inharmonious asso-
ciation have the right to partition in kind (see Miceli and Sirmans (2000)).
In case the partition of the land causes excessive fragmentation, a second
remedy is the sale of the undivided parcel with division of the proceeds in
proportion to each owner’s share. However, this second remedy is considered
an extrema ratio that courts should implement only in case there is a strong
evidence that land division is inefficient1. In absence of scale economies,
division in kind is de facto the only remedy according to the common law.
Division in kind is not problematic if the land (or the asset) to be divided
is homogeneous. However even if the land is homogeneous for the market
value, it could be heterogeneous with respect to owners’ preferences: owners’
evaluation may depend, in fact, on sentimental considerations or on private
information about the land (for instance, the presence of natural resources
in some parcels). If according to owners’ preferences the good is not homo-
geneous, a division in kind can be inefficient, and therefore courts have to
1”Physical division does not compel a person to sell his property against his will.
which, it has been said, should not be done except in case of imperious necessity” Miceli
and Sirmans (2000) p.794 quoting the court of the case of Trowbridge v. Donner (1950).
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try to elicit private information from the parties.
The case of two countries disputing over their border has similar features.
Often, the only feasible remedy is the division in kind. The territory object
of the dispute is rarely homogeneous, since many characteristics are relevant
to determine the preference of each country: the presence of ethnic groups, of
natural resources, geographic characteristics, (access to the sea for instance),
or strategic and military considerations, etc.. Also in this case a land divi-
sion may be not efficient and, moreover, it is far from being obvious which
normative properties can be called for.
The solution we are looking for and the mechanism to implement it,
should hold for a large class of problems. The solution should be applied to
solve disputes between co-owners in case of division of a land as also between
countries. The solution must be fair and efficient under the constraint of
the limited information available to any external party called to settle the
dispute (the arbitrator). We assume, in fact, that the arbitrator has not
much information about the litigants’ preferences, while parties have com-
plete information about each other. Namely the only information available
to the arbitrator is that the value of the parcel an agent receives is posi-
tively affected by its size; that is, a larger parcel it is always preferred to
a smaller one that is contained by it (set-inclusion property). This infor-
mational framework fits many real world situations. A judge who has to
partition a piece of land between two co-owners, two heirs or a divorcing
couple, hardly knows parties’ preferences, while it is very likely that each
party knows the preferences of the other party over the good to be divided.
Similarly, an international organization, like United Nations, which tries to
solve a dispute over a territory in the border of two countries cannot claim
to know which are the preferences of each country, even if they are common
information.
It is important to note that set-inclusion property does not mean that in
general any parcel of larger size is preferred to a smaller parcel, since as we
pointed out, the land to be divided is heterogenous. However, if preferences
satisfy this property, then the following easily follows. For any size µ, consider
the preferred parcel of that size by agent i, and call it a best parcel of size µ
for agent i (which of course is not necessarily unique). For each agent, his
best parcel of size µ is preferred to his best parcel of size µ′ if and only if
µ ≥ µ′.
As regards the properties that the solution has to satisfy, both efficiency
and fairness appear as necessary requirements. An inefficient solution can
be renegotiated between the parties: any property of an inefficient solution
is not necessarily preserved after renegotiation, and therefore to ask for nor-
mative properties without requiring efficiency turns to be a vacuous exercise.
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In the fair division literature, there are two main ordinal concepts of dis-
tributive justice2. The first is the envy-free principle which states that each
party should (weakly) prefers its share to anyone else’s. This was proposed
by Gamow and Stern (1958), but became known in the economics literature
after Foley (1967). Efficient and envy-free allocations are ex post stable be-
cause no one desires to exchange what he received with anyone else’s share.
However,there may be many efficient envy-free allocations, and individuals
may dispute on which one should be selected. The divide-and-choose mecha-
nism under complete information, for instance, selects among all the efficient
envy-free allocations the division that maximizes the payoff of the divider so
conflict is likely to shift over how the divider is chosen.
An alternative normative concept is the egalitarian equivalent criterion
which states that each party should be indifferent between getting her share
and some reference bundle, identical for all agents. However, in this case
the conflict is likely to shift on which reference bundle should be chosen, as
different reference bundles lead to different shares. Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) suggest eluding the problem by focusing only on those reference bun-
dles that are proportional to the total endowment (assuming efficiency, this
leads to a unique selection.). It is not immediately obvious how to extend
the ”Pazner-Schmeidler” rule when the endowment is a single heterogeneous
good. LiCalzi and Nicolo` (2009) suggests a way of constructing a reference
bundle for a heterogeneous infinitely divisible good. Each agent partitions
the good in finitely, or countably many, parcels that she considers as homo-
geneous. The common refinement of all the agents’ partitions the good in
parcels that are homogeneous for each agent. Hence by choosing the reference
bundle among those that are proportional to this common refinement, we end
up with a reference bundle that is ”proportional” to the total endowment as
suggested by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978). However, if the heterogeneous
good cannot be partitioned in finitely, or countably many, parcels, then the
problem of how to choose the reference bundle still arises.
In this paper we propose to overcome the informational constraints and
avoid an arbitrary choice of a reference bundle, using the concept of equal-
opportunity equivalence defined by Thomson (1994). Thomson (1994) com-
bines the ideas of equal opportunities and egalitarian-equivalence in the con-
text of economies with private and public goods. In such environments, an
allocation is said to be equal-opportunity equivalent relative to a family of
choice sets if there exists some reference set of this family such that each
agent is indifferent between the allocation and his best alternative in this
2See for instance Berliant et al. (1992) and Moulin (2004) for a complete overview of
modern contributions to the problem of distributive justice in economics.
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reference set. Since here the only commonly known characteristic is the set-
monotonic inclusion property of the preference domain, and the size is the
unique commonly observable (verifiable) characteristic of any set, we define
the concept of equal-opportunity equivalence with respect to a family of sets
with the same size. Our solution implies that each agent receives a parcel of
the land who makes him indifferent with respect to his best parcel of a given
size µ,where the size of the reference set must be the same for both agents.
The last question to solve is which size µ should be considered. Efficiency
requires to choose as reference set the largest size µ∗ such that both agents
are indifferent between the parcel they receive and their best parcel of that
size µ∗.
In the rest of the paper we first prove the existence of an efficient and
equal opportunity equivalent allocation for our problem and we propose a
simple procedure to implement a rule that selects such allocation at each
preference profile under the assumption that agents have complete informa-
tion about their preferences. The mechanism is the same used in Nicolo` and
Perea (2005), that generalizes a mechanism suggested in Crawford (1979)
and ameliorated in Demange (1984).
1.2 The Model
The problem we consider is how to divide a piece of land between two agents.
Let X ⊆ Rn, represent a piece of land which is bounded, connected and
Lebesgue-measurable. The set X is the total piece of land to be divided
among the two agents. Let L(X) be the set of all Lebesgue-measurable
subsets of X. By µ we denote the Lebesgue measure on Rn. The utility
function ui of agent i, i = 1, 2, is assumed to be a measure on L(X) that is
absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ. That is, if µ(A) = 0 for some A ∈ L(X), then
also ui(A) = 0. The number ui(A) represents the utility that agent i assigns
to the piece of land A. Since ui is absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ we know
by the Radon-Nykodim Theorem that there exists a non-negative function





for all A ∈ L(X).
Definition 1.1. A land division problem is a tuple P = (X, u1, u2) where X
is a connected and Lebesgue measurable subset of Rn, and u1, u2 are measures
on L(X) that are absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure.
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For a given land division problem P = (X, u1, u2), a feasible land division
is a pair (A1, A2) of subsets such that A2 = X\A1 and both A1 and A2 belong
to L(X).
Definition 1.2. A land division rule is a function D that assigns to every
land division problem P a feasible land division D(P ).
We shall focus on land division rules satisfying two properties: efficiency
and (a specific form of) equal opportunity equivalence. Efficiency is defined in
the usual sense, that is, a feasible land division (A1, A2) for P = (X, u1, u2) is
efficient if there is no other feasible division (B1, B2) for which ui(Bi) > ui(Ai)
and uj(Bj) ≥ uj(Aj) for i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Equal opportunity equivalence
states that there should be some number λ > 0 such that both agents are
indifferent between the part assigned to them and their most preferred piece
of land of size λ.
Definition 1.3. For a given land division problem P = (X, u1, u2), a feasible
land division (A1, A2) is equal opportunity equivalent if there is some λ > 0
such that
u1(A1) = max{u1(A) | A ∈ L(X) and µ(A) = λ} and
u2(A2) = max{u2(A) | A ∈ L(X) and µ(A) = λ}.
A land division rule is said to be efficient (equal opportunity equivalent)
if its assigns to every land division problem a feasible land division which is
efficient (equal opportunity equivalent).
1.3 Efficient and Equal Opportunity Equiva-
lent Rules
In this section we prove that there exist land division rules which are both
efficient and equal opportunity equivalent. For the proof of the following
theorem we need first the following lemmas:
Lemma 1.1. For every R ≤ ui(X), r ∈ [0, R] and for every measurable
B ⊂ X such that ui(B) = R there exists a measurable subset A ⊂ B such
that ui(A) = r, where i = 1, 2.
Proof. Given the absolute continuity of ui we can apply Theorem 1 in Dubins
and Spanier (1961). The convexity of the range ui(C), C ⊂ B, guarantees
that exists A ⊂ B such that ui(A) = r.
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Lemma 1.2. If uj(A˜\A) = 0 for every A ⊂ A˜ such that ui(A) = r we have
uj(A˜) = 0, where A˜ ⊂ X, r < ui(A˜) and i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j.
Proof. Let us suppose by contradiction that uj(A˜) 6= 0. That means that
there is a set A ⊂ A˜ such that the Radon-Nikodym derivative fj of uj is larger
than 0 almost everywhere on A. There are three possibilities: ui(A˜\A) can
be larger, equal or less than r. If it is equal to r then we have found a
contradiction, because uj(A) > 0. If ui(A˜\A) > r, using Lemma 1.1 we can
find a set A¯ ⊂ A˜\A such that ui(A¯) = r and uj(A˜\A¯) > 0, contradicting
the assumption. If ui(A˜\A) < r for Lemma 1.1 we can find a set B ⊂ A
such that ui(B) = r− ui(A˜\A), then defining C := B ∪ (A˜\A) we have that
ui(C) = r, and uj(A\B) > 0, which implies uj(A˜\C) > 0.
Lemma 1.3. The function
f(λ) := max{ui(A) : µ(A) = λ,A ∈ L(X)} (1.1)
exists for every 0 ≤ λ ≤ µ(X).
Proof. The max{ui(A) : µ(A) = λ,A ∈ L(X)} can be transformed
into max{ui(A) : µ(AC) = µ(X) − λ,A ∈ L(X)}. From the compactness
theorem of Dubins and Spanier (1961) we know that the range of the vector
(ui(A), µ(A
C)) as A varies in L(X) is compact. The vertical section of this
range is compact as well so f(λ) exists.
Theorem 1.1 (Existence). Let P = (X, u1, u2) be a land division problem.
Then, there exists a feasible land division (A1, A2) which is both efficient and
equal opportunity equivalent.
Proof. We first need some notation. Let L∗1(X) be the collection of those
subsets A ∈ L(X) such that u1(A) ≥ u1(B) for all B ∈ L(X) with µ(B) =
µ(A). Let R1 := u1(X) and R2 := u2(X). We define functions U2, Uˆ2 :
[0, R1]→ [0, R2] by
U2(r1) := max{u2(A2) | A2 ∈ L(X), ∃A1 ∈ L(X) such that
u1(A1) = r1 and A2 = X\A1},
and
Uˆ2(r1) := max{u2(B2) | B2 ∈ L(X), ∃B1 ∈ L∗1(X) such that
u1(B1) = r1, and µ(B2) = µ(B1)}.
In the same fashion we define U1(r2) and Uˆ1(r2).
First we need prove that:
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1. The functions Uˆ1 and Uˆ2, U1 and U2 exist,
2. Uˆ2(0) ≤ U2(0) = R2,
3. U2(R1) ≤ Uˆ2(R1) = R2,
4. U2 and U1 are weakly decreasing, Uˆ2 and Uˆ1 are weakly increasing
(monotonicity property),
5. the functions U2 and Uˆ2 are continuous in r1,
6. U1 is the inverse function of U2, and Uˆ1 is the inverse function of Uˆ2,
namely U2(r1) = U
−1
1 (r1) and Uˆ2(r1) = Uˆ
−1
1 (r1).
 (Existence) To prove the existence of Uˆ2 we need to prove that for every
r1 ∈ [0, R1] there exists a set B ⊂ X such that B ∈ L∗1(X) and u1(B) =
r1. This is equivalent to prove that the function f : [0, µ(X)] →
[0, u1(X)], f(λ) := max{u1(B)|µ(B) = λ} is continuous. The existence
of f is guaranteed by Lemma 1.3. f(λ) is a weakly increasing function.
Let us suppose by contradiction that in λ¯ f is not continuous. Then
there is an r1 such that limλ→λ¯− f(λ) < r1 < limλ→λ¯+ f(λ). For that r1
consider the function g(x) := min{λ|µ(A) = λ, u1(A) = x}. g(r1) can-
not be smaller than λ¯, because it would violate the maximum condition
of f(λ). Moreover it cannot be larger than λ¯, because there would be
a couple (λ, f(λ)) such that λ < g(r1) and f(λ) > r1. If we call A1 the
set generated by f(λ), for Lemma 1 there would be an A˜1 ⊂ A1 such
that u1(A˜1) = r1 and λ˜ = µ(A˜1) < g(r1) which violates the definition
of g. So g(r1) = λ¯, for every r1 that respects the inequality. Then g(x)
would be constant on [limλ→λ¯− f(λ), limλ→λ¯+ f(λ)]. This is not possible
because g(limλ→λ¯+ f(λ)) generates a set A that, for Lemma 1, strictly
contains an Aˆ such that u1(Aˆ) = limλ→λ¯− f(λ). So µ(Aˆ) < λ¯, violat-
ing the definition of g. The existence of the maximum in Uˆ2 is given
by Lemma 1.3. The existence of U2 is guaranteed by the compactness
theorem in Dubins and Spanier (1961), using the same reasoning of the
proof of Lemma 1.3. The proof of existence of Uˆ1 and U1 can be done
in the same way.
 The second and the third points are straightforward.
 (Monotonicity) If U2 were not decreasing there would be r˜1 and rˆ1 such
that r˜1 < rˆ1 and U2(r˜1) < U2(rˆ1). Defining (Aˆ1, Aˆ2) the partition
generated by U2(rˆ1) and (A˜1, A˜2) the partition generated by U2(r˜1) for
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Lemma 1 there must be an A1 ⊂ Aˆ1 such that u1(A1) = r˜1 and, us-
ing the set inclusion property, either u2(X\A1) > u2(Aˆ2), so u2(A˜2)
cannot be a maximum or u2(X\A1) = u2(Aˆ2). If there is no A1 such
that the strict inequality is satisfied then for Lemma 2 u2(Aˆ1) = 0 and
U2(rˆ1) = R2 and it is constant in [0, rˆ1].
Similarly we can prove the monotonicity property of U1 .
To prove that Uˆ2 is weakly increasing we take r˜1 and rˆ1 such that
r˜1 < rˆ1. Uˆ2(r˜1) generates (B˜1, B˜2) such that u1(B˜1) = r˜1, u2(B˜2) =
Uˆ2(r˜1) and µ(B˜1) = µ(B˜2).Then for any set B1 ∈ L(X) such that
u1(B1) = rˆ1 we will have µ(B1) ≥ µ(B˜1), otherwise B˜1 /∈ L∗1(X). Then
µ(B1) ≥ µ(B˜2) and any set B2 such that B˜2 ⊂ B2 and µ(B2) = µ(B1)
will satisfy the following inequality: u2(B2) ≥ u2(B˜2), proving that Uˆ2
is weakly increasing. We can be more specific and state that Uˆ2 can
be constant only if it is equal to R2. In fact if Uˆ2 is constant on [r¯1, rˆ1]
then calling Aˆ1 and A¯1 the maximal sets where rˆ1 and r¯1 are assumed
, it must be µ(Aˆ1) > µ(A¯1). The same must hold for the maximal sets
Aˆ2 and A¯2: µ(Aˆ1) = µ(Aˆ2) > µ(A¯2) = µ(A¯1). Then if u2(Aˆ2) = u2(A¯2)
the Radon-Nikodym derivative f2 must be zero almost everywhere on
X\A¯2 and Uˆ2(r¯1) = R2.
In the same fashion we can prove that Uˆ1 is weakly increasing.
 (Continuity) To prove the continuity of U2 let us do it by contradic-
tion: suppose that in r˜1 U2 is not continuous. For the monotonicity
property it must be a jump discontinuity and moreover limr˜−1 U2(r1) >
limr˜+1 U2(r1). Consider U1(r˜2), where we take limr˜
+
1
U2(r1) < r˜2 <
limr˜−1 U2(r1). Then U1(r˜2) cannot be larger than r˜1, otherwise U2(U1(r˜2)) <
r˜2 and would not be a maximum. Moreover U1(r˜2) cannot be smaller
than r˜1. Indeed for the monotonicity property there would be a cou-
ple (r1, U2(r1)) such that U2(r1) > r˜2 and r1 > U1(r˜2). This is not
possible because, calling (A¯1, A¯2) the partition generated by U2(r1),
for Lemma 1 there would be an A2 ⊂ A¯2 such that u2(A2) = r˜2 and
u1(X\A2) ≥ r1, and U1(r˜2) would not be a maximum. So U1(r˜2) = r˜1.











. This is not possible
because U1 and U2 can be constant only when they are respectively
equal to R1 and R2, where there would be no matter of discontinuity.





Then for all the feasible sets A2 ⊂ Aˆ2 such that u2(A2) = limr˜+1 U2(r1)
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it must be that u1(Aˆ2\A2) = 0. Then for Lemma 2 u1(Aˆ2) = 0, which




= R1. Then it must be
limr˜−1 U2(r1) = limr˜
+
1
U2(r1) so U2 must be continuous. We can prove in
the same fashion the continuity of U1, Uˆ2, Uˆ1.
 (Inverse functions) Let us suppose by contradiction that in r1 U2(r1) <
U−11 (r1). This is not possible because U2(r1) should be the maximum





such that u1(A˜1) = r1 and u2(A˜2) > u2(A2). Instead
if U2(r1) > U
−1





















> r1. This is a violation of the maximum condition of U1.
So U2(r1) = U
−1
1 (r1). The proof that Uˆ2(r1) = Uˆ
−1
1 (r1) comes from the
definition of the two functions.
By these properties, applying the Bolzano Theorem to the function (U2−
Uˆ2)(r1), there must be some r
∗











1). By definition of U2, there are subsets A1, A2 ∈ L(X) such that
1. u1(A1) = r
∗
1 and u2(A2) = r
∗
2,
2. A2 = X\A1, and
3. given that U2(r1) = U
−1
1 (r1) and Uˆ2(r1) = Uˆ
−1
1 (r1) there is no feasible









2)) 6= (r∗1, r∗2) .
Since the function U2 is weakly decreasing and Uˆ2 is weakly increasing
it follows from (1), (2) and (3) that (A1, A2) is a feasible and efficient land
division with u1(A1) = r
∗
1 and u2(A2) = r
∗
2.
On the other hand, by definition of Uˆ2 there are subsets B1, B2 ∈ L(X)
and a number λ > 0 such that
(4) u1(B1) = r
∗
1 and u2(B2) = r
∗
2,
(5) µ(B1) = µ(B2) = λ,
(6) u1(B1) = max{u1(B) | B ∈ L(X) and µ(B) = λ}, and
(7) u2(B2) = max{u2(B) | B ∈ L(X) and µ(B) = λ}.
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Here, (6) follows from the assumption that B1 ∈ L∗1(X). By (4) - (7),
and our previous insight that (A1, A2) is a feasible and efficient land division
with u1(A1) = r
∗
1 and u2(A2) = r
∗
2, it follows that the feasible land division
(A1, A2) is efficient and equal opportunity equivalent. This completes the
proof.

Theorem 1.2 (Uniqueness). All the efficient and equal opportunity equiva-
lent land divisions (A1, A2) yield a unique utility pair (u1(A1), u2(A2)) if the
Radon-Nikodym derivatives f1 and f2 respectively of u1 and u2 are different
from zero almost everywhere on X.
Proof. If the Radon-Nikodym derivatives f1 and f2 are different from
zero a.e. on X the function U2 is strictly decreasing and the function Uˆ2 is
strictly increasing on on [0, R1]. Then they cross just in one point (r1, r2)
which is the unique utility pair that can be obtained by any efficient and
equal opportunity equivalent land division.

1.4 The mechanism
In this section we present a simple mechanism to implement an efficient and
equal opportunity equivalent allocation when agents have complete informa-
tion.
Round 1. Agent 1 announces λ ∈ [0, µ(X)]. Agent 2 can take any portion
B2 such that µ(B2) ≤ λ or propose a land division (A1, A2) ∈ L(X)×L(X).
If agent 2 takes B2, agent 1 gets X\B2. If agent 2 proposes a land division
(A1, A2) ∈ L(X)× L(X), then round 2 is played
Round 2. Agent 1 can accept agent 2’s proposal and in this case the proposal
is implemented, or reject it and take any portion B1 with µ(B1) ≤ λ. In case
of rejection agent 2 gets the portion X\B1.
For any λ ∈ [0, µ(X)] and for any i = 1, 2 letBλi = {B ∈ L(X)|arg max ui(B)
s.t. µ(B) ≤ λ}.
The equilibrium concept used is subgame perfection; for short, we simply
speak of “equilibrium”.
Theorem 1.3. The mechanism described above has unique equilibrium pay-
offs, with final allocations that are efficient and equal opportunity equivalent.
In every equilibrium allocation, each agent i is indifferent between the parcel
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he receives and getting ui(B
λ∗
i ), where λ
∗ = max {λ : there exists (A1, A2) ∈ L(X)× L(X)
with ui(Ai) ≥ ui(Bλi ) for each i}
Proof. We proceed by stating and proving some easy lemmas.
Lemma 1.4. Suppose that agent 1 has announced λ at round 1 and agent 2
has made a proposal (A1, A2) at round 2. Agent 1 accepts agent 2’s proposal
if and only if u1(A1) ≥ u1(Bλ1 ), otherwise he takes Bλ1 .
The proof of lemma 1.4 is straightforward.




2) ∈ {(A1, A2) ∈ L(X)× L(X)|arg maxu2(·)s.t.u1(A1) = u1(Bλ1 )}
(1.2)
if and only if u2(A
λ
2) ≥ u2(Bλ2 ); if u2(Aλ2) < u2(Bλ2 ) then he takes the
portion Bλ2 .
Proof. By lemma 1.4 agent 1 accepts a proposal if and only u1(A1) ≥ u1(Bλ1 ).
Since agent 2 can chop off a morsel of agent 1’s portion and give it to himself,
then if he makes a proposal (A1, A2) it must be that u1(A1) ≤ u1(Bλ1 ). Hence
agent 2’s best proposal satisfies the constraint u1(A1) = u1(B
λ
1 ). Finally
agent 2 makes a proposal only if there exists a proposal which guarantees to
him a payoff higher than the payoff he gets by taking the portion Bλ2 (note
that any agent 2’s proposal that is rejected by agent 1 is payoff equivalent
to the (acceptable) proposal (A1, A2) = (B
λ
1 , X\Bλ1 ))







2 ) ∈ A be such that for all Aλ ∈ A, λ ≤ λ∗.
Lemma 1.6. At round 1, agent 1 proposes λ∗.
Proof. Suppose agent 1 proposes λ∗ at round 1. By lemma 1.5 at round




2 ) and agent 1 accepts. Hence
agent 1 by proposing λ∗ at round 1, gets u1(Aλ
∗
1 ) = u1(B
λ∗
1 ). Suppose agent
1 proposes λ < λ∗. For all λ < λ∗ (Aλ1 , A
λ
2) ∈ A. By Lemmas 1.4 and 1.5
by proposing λ agent 1 obtains u1(B
λ
1 ) < u1(B
λ∗
1 ). Suppose now agent 1
proposes λ > λ∗.By definition of λ∗, (Aλ1 , A
λ
2) /∈ A and u2(Aλ2) < u2(Bλ2 ).
By lemma 1.5, agent 2 at round 2 takes Bλ2 and agent 1 gets X\Bλ2 . Since
λ > λ∗, it follows that u2(Bλ2 ) > u2(B
λ∗





is an efficient allocation, it follows that u1(X\Bλ2 ) < u1(Aλ∗1 ) = u1(Bλ∗1 ).

Chapter 2
Lobbying in a multidimensional
policy space with salient issues
2.1 Introduction
In 2012 in the US 3.30 billion dollars were spent on lobbying the Congress
and federal agencies. In 2012 there were 12411 unique, registered lobbying
firms in the US1. The amount of resources devoted to this activity and the
number of firms involved shows the relevance of lobbying in the policy making
process. In the political economy literature with a fixed number of candi-
dates, the equilibrium policy, resulting from the interaction of the voting and
lobbying processes, is determined by the maximization of a weighted sum of
the utility function of lobbies and some aggregate welfare function of voters,
see Grossman and Helpman (1996). Lobbying therefore, in these models, has
always an effect on the implemented policy.
A recent literature, initiated by Besley and Coate (2001) and Osborne and
Slivinski (1996), has endogenized the number of candidates, allowing politi-
cians to be selected, by majority voting, among those citizens who choose to
enter the electoral campaign. The citizen-candidate framework was meant to
provide useful insights on the endogenous positions of candidates and their
number. Nonetheless the citizen-candidate model with lobbying, introduced
by Besley and Coate (2001) on a unidimensional policy space, predicts that
lobbies do not have an effect on the equilibrium policy. Indeed voters can
always support candidates with offsetting policy preferences, thus lobbying
changes the identity of the elected politician, but not the implemented policy.
Considering that the possibility of finding offsetting candidates is inherent
of citizen-candidate models, it seems that they are not fit for understanding
1http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php
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lobbying.
In this paper we overcome this limitation, investigating a citizen-candidate
model with lobbying on a multidimensional policy space. A multidimensional
policy space is a very realistic environment for studying the interaction be-
tween voters and candidates, because citizens truly have preferences on many
different issues, from taxation to environmental topics and moral values. All
these matters are subject to the action of elected politicians.
Multidimensionality innovates Besley and Coate (2001) because, with
many topics in the policy space, it is natural to differentiate them based
on their salience. Indeed in every national and local political race voters
consider some issues more important than others. For example in the United
States in the 2012 the state of the economy was important for 92% voters2.
Issues like gay marriage and abortion was instead important for 38 % voters.
In the model presented here we introduce two types of citizens, differentiated
by their ranking of issues. For example, one type gives more importance to
state of the economy, while the other type considers the moral issue the most
relevant. The type is private information of the citizen. Still for each type
citizens have heterogenous preferences for policies in each dimension, e.g. for
the type that considers the state of the economy the most relevant, there are
citizens who believe in state intervention, and others who think there should
be more market and less state. Given that candidates are citizens, they
also have types. To keep the analysis more intuitive we introduce a single
unidimensional lobby per issue. When faced with contributions from lobbies
after elections, an elected politician of a type that considers the economy
more relevant, will please more the lobby on the moral issue, because the
policy preferences of the politician are weaker on that topic. Therefore,
different types of politicians implement different policies. Going back to the
voting stage, we prove that there are pooling equilibria, in which citizens
are not able to identify the type of the candidates, and vote on expected
policies. Hence they will offset lobbying either too much or too little, and as
anticipated, in equilibrium lobbying will have an effect on the implemented
policy.
There are other results that flow naturally from the setting of the game.
One of them is that if, for all types of citizens, the salience of an issue is
lowered, then the lobby that works on that topic increases its influence on the
implemented policy. Thus the most effective lobbies are the ones that work
on the topics that people care less about. This result provides an explanation
of why politicians are more sensitive to lobbying, and therefore less sensitive
to voters’preferences, on some issues. For example, in January 2003, 63 % of
2http://www.gallup.com/poll/153029/economy-paramount-issue-voters.aspx
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Americans were against the US government’s decision of invading Iraq3. In
2005, 64% of Italian voters, 55% among rightwing ones, were in favour of civil
unions, but the parliament rejected the law proposal4. Still in Italy, in 2010,
the parliament voted laws for building new nuclear plants and privatizing the
public water system. Nevertheless, a citizen initiative in 2011 brought 54 %
of the italian voting population to vote on these issues, and 96% of citizens
who showed up voted for the rejection of these laws.
Another finding that emerges from the equilibrium analysis is that some
citizens, with the same most preferred policy but with a different ranking
of issues, vote for different candidates. An example referred to the Ameri-
can Presidential elections of 2012 would be two citizens, both wishing more
income redistribution and against legal abortion, who voted for different can-
didates, because one thought the economy was more important than moral
issues and supported Obama, while the other citizen felt the opposite and
voted for Romney.
An extension of the model partially endogenizes the power of lobbies.
We provide citizens with the possibility of giving monetary contributions to
lobbies in order to increase their ability to move the implemented policy
closer to their bliss point. With more than one lobby per issue we find that,
under some conditions, only the more extreme lobbies in every dimension
receive contributions. When studying the effect of the salience of an issue on
citizens’ contributions to lobbying, we find that the effectiveness of a lobby
is maximized when the salience of a topic is low for most of citizens and high
for a small group. This small group is indeed the special interest group the
finances the lobby.
All the results mentioned above are derived from the three main ingre-
dients of the model. The main contribution of this paper is thus to bring
together in a citizen candidate model lobbying, multidimensionality of the
policy space and salience of issues.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 makes a literature review on
voting and lobbying. Section 2.3 introduces the model. Section 2.4 presents
the results, section 2.5 endogenizes lobbying, while section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
An extended literature exists on voting and lobbying, in most of it lobby-
ing is modeled through menu auctions: the politician receives contributions
contingent on the implemented policy. See Bernheim and Whinston (1986),
3http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/23/opinion/polls/main537739.shtml
4http://www.repubblica.it/2005/i/sezioni/politica/prodipacs/itafavo/itafavo.html?ref=search
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Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Besley and Coate (2001). The citizen
candidate model has been developed separately by Osborne and Slivinski
(1996) and Besley and Coate (1997). Osborne and Slivinski (1996) study the
model on a single dimension and assumes sincere voting, while Besley and
Coate (1997) prove their results on a multidimensional setting with strategic
voters. Besley and Coate (2001) take the one dimensional citizen candidate
model and add lobbies. In this paper in equilibrium lobbying is always offset
by the voters, who foresee the subsequent lobbying and strategically delegate
undoing the work of lobbies. Even though lobbies pay their contributions and
there is an effect of interest groups on the choice of candidates, there is no
effect on the implemented policy. We will study the citizen candidate model
on a multidimensional policy space, with salient issues, with strategic vot-
ing and lobbies. Moreover coherently with the idea that information about
the general salience of issues is incomplete, during the electoral campaign
we assume that there are different types of voters, each of them identified
with a different ranking of issues. It is not known which type is a voter
by the other citizens. In this way we also address the strategic delegation,
showing that in some cases there is a visible of effect of lobbying on the
implemented policy. Felli and Merlo (2006) study the interaction between
voting and lobbying on a unidimensional setting where the elected politician
can choose which lobbies to receive contributions from. They show an ef-
fect of lobbying on policies. Glaeser et al. (2005) argue that Republicans
and Democrats have become increasingly extremist on the religious issue,
to induce their core constituencies to show up and vote, and that is caused
by a growing religious sentiment in the US. Reading this fact through the
lenses of our model we should see an effect of lobbying on non moral related
issues in these last years. It is indeed true that for example the Buffet rule
was supported by the 72 % of Americans, 53 % among Republicans 5. Still
it was not approved by the Congress. Krasa and Polborn (2010) created
a multidimensional binary model with salient issues. They argue that pol-
icy spaces, formed by finite and especially binary choices on each issue, are
common in electoral campaigns and deliver more realistic results. In their
setting candidates start with some fixed positions on some dimensions and
fight for swing voters on others, where they are flexible. Besley and Coate
(2008) analyze the positive role of citizens’ initiatives or referenda, in order
to bring implemented policies closer to the will of the majority. The reasons
why, even if a Condorcet winner policy in all dimensions exists, it could not
be implemented, are that in all elections issues are bundled together. They
5http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/16/cnn-poll-7-out-of-10-support-
buffett-rule/
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identify three main channels: a divergence between the elite of a party and
the popular opinion on non salient issues, a group of voters who vote as a
single issue voter on a minority view, and when a minority view is supported
by an interest group on a non salient issue. The third case is the one we
focus on in this paper. Two papers that consider the salience of issues are
Roemer (1998) and Lee and Roemer (2006). Roemer (1998) investigates with
a theoretical model why a redistributive political party could be forced to
propose a low tax rate, in a world with two issues (tax policy and religion), if
the religious dimension becomes very salient. Lee and Roemer (2006) study
empirically how racism among voters contributed to reduce the income tax
rate in the US in the period 1976-1992. While the reasoning behind Roemer
(1998) relies on a specific distribution of voters in the policy space, in partic-
ular on the presence of a large poor racist part of the population, the results
of our model explain the same phenomenon analyzed by Roemer (1998) and
are valid for any distribution of citizens in the policy space.
Finally there is an important part of the political economy literature
dedicated to the empirical study of the dimensions of the political space and
the bliss points of MPs. Poole and Rosenthal (1985) use data on the roll call
voting on the US House and Senate to test the program NOMINATE on the
positions of MPs in a unidimensional model. Poole and Rosenthal (1997)
and Poole and Rosenthal (2001) integrate this initial work with a dynamic
program, testing for the number of dimensions of the political space of MPs.
They find that the multidimensionality of the policy space can be reduced
to 2. Hix et al. (2006) test the same statistical model on the European
Parliament. The concept of policy space in our model is different from the
political space of Poole and Rosenthanl. They collapse the policy space in a
2-dimensional political space because most of the times MPs vote following
their party direction on the conservative-liberal axis, while on other votes
their behavior can be regrouped following the North-South US axis. The
number of dimensions is thus related to the number of opposite parliamentary
blocks that appear in different votes. Instead the dimensions of the policy
space in our model refer to different issues that affect voters. We do not
model parliamentary voting and assume a single politician implements a
multidimensional policy when she is elected.
2.3 The Model
The K−dimensional policy space is denoted by D = [0, 1]K . The set of
citizens is denoted by N = {1, ...,M}. Citizen i ∈ N has the following utility
function:








where qk is the kth element of the vector policy q ∈ D. u(qk, qik) is strictly
concave in qk, single-peaked and symmetric around q
i
k. q
i is citizen i’s bliss
point. ρ measures the intensity of citizen’s preferences over money with
respect to policy. λik ≥ 0 is the weight given by citizen i to dimension or
issue k. We normalize λi1 = 1, so all other weights are relative to the first
one.
We assume that M is large enough such that the density function f on the
space D = [0, 1]K and “cumulative” induced measure F , such that F (A) =∫
A
fdµ,A ⊂ D, can be assumed to be continuous6.
Lobbies have a similar utility function. For simplicity we assume that there
is just one lobby for each dimension:
V (q, k) = µku(qk, q
L
k ) + y
L
k , (2.2)
where µk is an idiosyncratic parameter for every lobby. µk is the relative
intensity of lobby’s preferences for policy with respect to money. For the
same utility gain a lobby with higher µk is willing to pay more. We normalize








2.3.1 Uncertainty about voters’ preferences
Some parts of our analysis will be restricted to K = 2. In this setting we will
assume that there are only two types of citizens: type 1 is characterized by






2, meaning that type 1 citizens
weight more dimension 1 with respect to type 2 citizens. The types set is
denoted by T = {1, 2}. Citizens of type 1 and 2 have the same distribution f
on the policy space. The type of each citizen is not known at the beginning,
there is a common prior: each citizen has probability p of being of type 1
and probability 1 − p of being of type 2. We parameterize λ12 = θη and
λ22 = (2 − θ)η, θ < 1, where η = 1/2(λ12 + λ22) is the arithmetic average
of the two parameters. Uncertainty about types of voters makes this game
Bayesian.
6This assumption was made also in Felli and Merlo (2006). Having an infinite and
continuous amount of strategic voters poses theoretical questions about the definition of
the equilibria and the consistency of the game. In a later version of the paper we prove
that the equilibria presented in this chapter exist also with a finite number of citizens.
Moreover they are the only equilibria that exist for a large, but finite, number of citizens.
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2.3.2 Entry of candidates
Each citizen can enter as a candidate paying a small cost c. We denote by
σ(i, t) : S × T → {0, 1} the decision of type t citizen i, σ(i, t) = 1 indicates
(i, t)’s decision to enter as a candidate, while if σ(i, t) = 0 (i, t) will stay out.
We define C(σ) = {i ∈ S : ∃t such that σ(i, t) = 1} the set of candidates for
every entry function σ. If no one runs for office we assume that a default
policy qsq ∈ [0, 1]K is implemented.
2.3.3 Voting
Every citizen has one vote to cast for one of the candidates in C(σ). Given
C(σ) each citizen simultaneously decides to cast a vote for a candidate or
abstain. Let γ(i) citizen i’s choice, if γ(i) = e citizen i casts a vote for
candidate e ∈ C(σ), if γ(i) = 0 she abstains. Each citizen makes her decision
maximizing her expected utility, given the choice of other voters. Voters are
strategic. The candidate that gets more votes is elected. If two or more
candidates tie the winner is selected with equal probability among all the
tying candidates. The voting subgame is also Bayesian, because the voters’
types are private information.
2.3.4 Lobbying
Lobbies offer the winning candidate binding contracts contingent to the fu-
ture implemented policy. The contribution, or willingness to pay, offered by
lobby k to politician P for a policy q is defined as follows:
w(qk, k) = µk[u(qk, q
L
k )− u(qPk , qLk )], (2.3)
which is the utility gain lobby k gets if policy q is implemented instead of
policy qP . The elected politician receives contributions from all the lobbies
and chooses q∗ maximizing her utility after lobbying:











k )− u(qPk , qLk )]. (2.4)
Summarizing the timing of the game is the following:
1. citizens simultaneously decide to enter as candidates,
2. voters simultaneously vote for a candidate or abstain,
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3. lobbies offer contributions to the winning candidate,
4. the elected politician implements a policy.
In order to have closed form solutions we assume the concave function u(x, y)
takes the following form:
u(x, y) = − (x− y)2










λi1 0 · · · 0









µ1 0 · · · 0





0 0 · · · µK
 .
2.4 Results
We proceed backwards to solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
multistage game. We start from the last stage: lobbying and the implemen-
tation of a policy by the elected politician. We keep K unspecified in this
subgame, and restrict to K = 2 in the voting subgame.
2.4.1 Equilibria in the lobbying subgame
After elections are over one candidate P becomes the politician and, aware
of the lobbying contributions, decides which policy q∗ to implement.





ΛP qP + ρMqL
)
. (2.5)
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The equilibrium policy is unique, given the entry function σ, and voting de-
cision γ.
If ΛP = Λ is common for all citizens the implemented policy is:





The proof is presented in the appendix.
The politician implements a policy which is a convex combination of her
most preferred policy and the most preferred policy of the lobbies, in each
dimension. If the ranking Λ is the same for every citizen then in dimension







Figure 2.1: Divergence between A bliss point and A impl policy. λA2 >> λ
A
1
The salience of each dimension λj interacts with ρ and µj to determine the
implemented policy. In the following sections the superscript P is dropped
from q∗, when there is no confusion about the identity of the politician. We
now perform some comparative statics.
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If there is a common ranking Λ we define q∗(λj), where we underline the
dependence of the equilibrium policy q∗ on the common salience of issue j.
q∗(λoj) and q
∗(λlj) are then two equilibrium policies that arise with the same
set of parameters λi 6=j,M, ρ, c, qi, apart from λj. It is important to notice
that q∗(λj) could not be an equilibrium for some λj > 0.
Proposition 2.1. Given a politician with bliss point qP , and λij, λ
l
j > 0, if
q∗(λij) and q
∗(λlj) are both equilibria, then:
λij < λ
l
j =⇒ |q∗j (λij)− qLj | < |q∗j (λlj)− qLj |. (2.7)
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If an issue is less salient it is easier for the lobby in that dimension to move
the implemented policy closer to its bliss point.
With abuse of notation we define q∗(µj), where the equilibrium imple-
mented policy now depends on µj, the preference for policy with respect to
money of lobby j. The other parameters are fixed.
Proposition 2.2. Given µij, µ
l
j > 0, if q
∗(µij) and q




j =⇒ |q∗j (µij)− qLj | > |q∗j (µlj)− qLj |. (2.8)
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If a lobby has stronger preferences for policy with respect to money in a
dimension, the implemented policy is closer to the lobby’s bliss point.
Now we restrict to K = 2 and we use the parametrization of λ12 and λ
2
2.
We define q∗(η) as before. We state the following:
Proposition 2.3. Given ηi, ηl > 0, if q∗(ηi) and q∗(ηl) are both equilibria,
then:
ηi < ηl =⇒ |q∗P2 (ηi)− qL2 | < |q∗P2 (ηl)− qL2 |, (2.9)
for a politician P of type 1 or 2.
The proof is presented in the appendix.
If a dimension is less salient for all types of voters in the population
the lobby obtains a higher utility gain from the policy implemented by the
elected candidate. Proposition 2.1 and 2.3 say that a lobby can “move” the
policy maker closer to its bliss point if the issue on which the interest group is
lobbying is less salient for all citizens. These comparative statics confirm our
prediction: in this model the elected politician in the most salient dimensions
implements a policy closer to her own bliss point, in less salient issues she
pleases lobbies.
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2.4.2 Voting Equilibrium
In the voting equilibrium we rule out weakly dominated strategies, as in
Besley and Coate (1997). We concentrate our attention on two-candidate
equilibria. If in the entry stage equilibrium the two types of the same citizen
i take different actions, for example type A of citizen i enters as a candidate
and type 2 does not, voters correctly predict that they are facing type A of
candidate i and they behave accordingly. If the two types of citizen i take
the same action, voters use the prior on the types to compute the expected
implemented policy. Consequently in this section we identify the candidates
with the policies voters think they will implement, anticipating also the effect
of lobbying. We call them candidates’ expected policies.
If there is just one type of voters and two candidates, C(σ) = {A,B}, given
that in this situation strategic voting implies sincere voting, to compute the
voting equilibrium we partition the policy space, computing for each candi-
date c ∈ C(σ) the subsetN(c) = {qv ∈ D|v ∈ N, c = arg maxP∈C(σ) u(q∗P , v)},
where q∗P is candidate P ’s expected policy. The winning candidate is P =
arg maxc∈C(σ) F (N(c)).
With just one type of voters the partition of the policy space D is carried
through separating hyperplanes: if λ1 = λ2 the hyperplane is orthogonal to
the segment connecting the expected policies of the two candidates and cuts
it in half. If λ1 6= λ2 the hyperplane cuts in half the segment connecting
the two candidates’ policies and “leans” towards the more important dimen-
sion. Indeed if the expected policies of candidates A and B are respectively
(xA, yA) and (xB, yB) the derivative of the separating hyperplane is
λ1(xB−xA)
λ2(yA−yB) .
We define such hyperplane hλ1λ2 . It is worth noticing that the angle between
the orthogonal hyperplane and the “leaning” one depends not only on the
relative weights but also on the positions of the two candidates. Indeed if
the two candidates have the same positions on one of the two issues, that is
either xA = xB or yA = yB the orthogonal and the “leaning” hyperplanes
coincide.
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Figure 2.2: A separating hyperplane “leaning” towards dimension 1
With two types of voters there is uncertainty about the number of citi-
zens who vote for a candidate, because depending on their type, they could
vote for one or another candidate. The Law of Large Numbers helps us in
having easy results, indeed the probability distribution of voters for a can-
didate is degenerate, when the number of voters is infinite. Let us make an
example with K = 2 and two types of voters: if the entry stage delivered
two candidates, we will have the following partition of the policy space:
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Figure 2.3: Partition of the policy space with 2 types of voters
The dots A and B represent candidates A and B’s expected policies. The
hyperplanes h1λ12 and h1λ22 partition the policy space in 4 areas. As we can see
there are two areas, W and Y , where the two types of same citizen vote for
the same candidate. There are other two areas, X and Z, where the two types
vote for different candidates. In area X every citizen votes with probability
p for A and with probability 1 − p for B. In area Y the converse is true.
In area X we are interested to know the probability density function g(y)
of the proportion y of citizens voting for A, which is equivalent to compute





for n→∞, where Xi is the Bernoullian
variable taking value 1 if citizen i with bliss point qi ∈ X is of type 1. For
the law of Large Numbers we know that the limit converges almost surely to
the expected value E(X1) = E(X2) = ... = p. We then know that the event
“of all citizens with bliss point in X p of them vote for A” has probability 1.
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It is necessary for the characterization of the equilibria to understand under
which conditions 2 candidates will split in half the constituency.
Lemma 2.2. A necessary condition for a two-candidate equilibrium with



















where (W,X, Y, Z) result from the partition of the space by two separating
hyperplanes, h1,λ12 and h1,λ22. In W citizens of both type vote for A, in Y
citizens of both types vote for B, in X type 1 citizens vote for A and type
2 citizens vote for B and the converse in Y . If the candidates’ expected
policies q∗A and q∗B are such that q∗Ai = q
∗B
i for i either ∈ {1, 2} h1,λ12 and






The next lemma gives states conditions about the entry of a third candi-
date.
Lemma 2.3. There is a subgame voting equilibrium, where voters face 3
candidates and 2 candidates’ expected implemented policies satisfy condition
2.10, such that the candidate, whose expected implemented policy does not
satisfy 2.10, loses with certainty.
2.4.3 Entry Equilibrium
To characterize a two-candidate equilibrium we need to study the Bayesian
nature of the entry stage. We know that a necessary condition for a two
tying candidate equilibrium is given by equation 2.10. In equation 2.10 the
four areas are defined by the hyperplanes, which are based on the candidates’
expected policies. Let us define σ∗ the equilibrium entry function. If for all
i ∈ C(σ∗) σ∗(i, 1) = σ∗(i, 2) the entry equilibrium is defined totally pooling.
If for all i ∈ C(σ∗) σ∗(i, 1) 6= σ∗(i, 2) the entry equilibrium is defined totally
separating. If the entry equilibrium is totally separating, the expected poli-
cies are the implemented policies, if the entry equilibrium is totally pooling,
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the expected policies are the expected implemented policies. In this section
with abuse of notation we refer to q∗it as the policy implemented by type t
candidate i if she were elected, and to Pt if nature has drawn type t for can-
didate P . We refer also to the Euclidean distance in R2 between x and y as
|x−y|. We denote −t as the non t type. When there are only two candidates
we denote −P as the non P candidate. We define q¯P := pq∗P1 + (1− p)q∗P2
the expected implemented policy of candidate P .
There is an infinite amount of entry equilibria given by the positions of the
candidates. In a game without uncertainty about the types of candidates,
and without uncertainty about the voting behavior, a necessary condition
for a 2 candidates equilibrium is that the 2 candidates tie. Otherwise one
candidate would lose for sure and would rather not enter and save c. More-
over when the population of strategic voters is large Besley and Coate (1997)
prove that there cannot be equilibria with more than 2 candidates. In our
game the uncertainty about voting behavior is solved with the law of large
number. For what concerns uncertainty about the types of candidates, if we
have a pooling equilibrium we know that in the voting stage citizens will face
2 candidates, even though they do not know their identity. In this case the
expected implemented policies of the candidates must split the electorate
evenly. Instead, if we have a separating equilibrium, it could be that the
type that is supposed to enter of a certain candidate is not drawn by Na-
ture. Therefore citizens in the voting stage would face only one candidate.
This changes the incentives to enter as a candidate, because a candidate
that would lose against its opponent could find convenient to enter, indeed
with some probability the other candidate is not drawn and she wins with
certainty. Consequently there will be separating equilibria with 2 tying can-
didates, and with 2 non tying candidates. The same reasoning opens the way
to separating equilibria with more than 2 candidates. 2 candidates equilibria
with non tying candidates and equilibria with more than 2 candidates are
not analyzed in this chapter.
In the next theorems we state the conditions such that 2 candidates find
convenient to enter.
Condition 2.1 (strong non proximity). A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) =
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U(q∗B−s , B−s)− U(q¯A, B−s)
]
> c,
where U(q∗i, i) includes the lobbies’ contribution.
Condition 2.2 (non proximity). A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) =




U(q∗At , At)− ps
2




U(q∗Bs , Bs)− ps
2




U(q∗A−t , A−t)− ps
2




U(q∗B−s , B−s)− ps
2
U(q∗At , B−s) < c+ (1− pt)U(qsq, B−s),
and for all citizens r ∈ N , that would win with certainty pairwise against
either At or Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ptps)U(q∗r, r) < c+pt(1−ps)U(q∗At , r)+ps(1−pt)U(q∗Bs , r)+(1−ps)(1−pt)U(qsq, r),
(2.14)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would lose with certainty pairwise against both At
or Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ps)(1− pt)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (2.15)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would lose with certainty against At and win
against Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− pt)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− pt)psU(q∗Bs , r) + (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (2.16)
for all citizens r ∈ N , that would win with certainty against At and lose
against Bs, the following condition is satisfied:
(1− ps)U(q∗r, r) < c+ (1− ps)ptU(q∗At , r) + (1− ps)(1− pt)U(qsq, r), (2.17)
where pt and ps are the prior probabilities respectively of types t and s, and
U(q∗i, i) includes the lobbies’ contribution.
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Theorem 2.1 (totally pooling). A two-candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) = {A,B},
exists and is totally pooling if and only if condition 2.1 is satisfied and
the two expected implemented policies q¯A = pq∗A1 + (1 − p)q∗A2 and q¯B =
pq∗B1 + (1− p)q∗B2 generate hyperplanes h1,λ12 and h1,λ22 that satisfy equation
2.10.
Theorem 2.1 says that a sufficient condition for a two-candidate totally
pooling equilibrium is that the expected implemented policies split in half the
electorate. All types of candidates A and B find profitable to enter because
they have 1/2 probability to win and for condition 2.1 they are better off
than letting the other candidate win.
Theorem 2.2 (totally separating). A two tying candidate equilibrium, C(σ∗) =
{At, Bs}, exists and is totally separating if condition 2.2 is satisfied and the
two policies q∗At and q∗Bs generate hyperplanes h1,λ12 and h1,λ22 that satisfy
equation 2.10.
Theorem 2.2 says that a sufficient condition for a two-candidate totally
separating equilibrium is that nature selects types whose implemented poli-
cies split in half the constituency. Moreover for condition 2.2 only one type
per candidate must find convenient to enter. Still for condition 2.2 a third
candidate would not find convenient to enter.
Figure 2.4: Positions of a 2 candidates totally pooling equilibrium
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With abuse of notation we define the implemented policy q∗(ρ) in equilib-
rium as depending on the parameter ρ, the preference for money of citizens,
while keeping all other parameters constant.
Proposition 2.4. In totally pooling equilibria the interest groups’ lobbying
has an effect on the implemented policy, that is
q∗(ρ) 6= q∗(0),
for every ρ > 0.
The entry equilibrium analysis delivers several results: first of all, dif-
ferently from Besley and Coate (1997) we have an effect of lobbying on im-
plemented policies if the equilibrium is totally pooling. Indeed in a totally
pooling entry equilibrium both types of the same candidate enter, voters do
no know which type they face so they vote on expected policies. Depending
on the type of candidate realized, they will have offset either too much or too
little. Therefore lobbying can matter for implemented policies, and in our
model the channel is the incomplete information about general salient issues
in the electoral campaign. The difference between a totally pooling and a
totally separating equilibrium is that in the latter the candidates entering
are signalling their type, not only with their action of entering, but also with
the opponent’s action.
2.5 Endogenizing lobbying
We present here an extension of the model where citizens can interact directly
with lobbies, giving them monetary contributions in order to increase their
power and thus obtain a more favorable implemented policy.
We assume that preference intensity for policy with respect to money and
the salience of issues are idiosyncratic, i.e. ρi and λij for citizen i. We assume
also that there can be more than one lobby for every political dimension.
Contribution to lobbies is implemented after elections are over. To simplify
the analysis we also assume that after elections and before contribution takes
place the type of each citizen is revealed. If a subset R ⊂ N of citizens













k is the monetary contribution of citizen i to lobby k,
and bLk is a positive constant





7We assume that citizens’ monetary contribution affects µLk and thus the willingness to
pay w with a decreasing margin, the same results would be obtained if we assume that the
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Citizens contribute after elections are over and before lobbies offer their con-
tribution schedules to the elected politician.
If a citizen contributes yik to lobby k the interest group increases its prefer-
ences for the policy, this has a positive effect on the contribution schedule
offered to the politician and thus on q∗P , moving it closer to the bliss point
of the lobby.
Let us define
yMk (ρ, qk, λk) :=
[






Proposition 2.5. In equilibrium only a subset Rk ⊂ N donates to lobby k.
Citizen i belongs to Rk if and only if (q
i
k− q∗k)(qLk − qPk ) ≥ 0 and (ρi, qik, λik) ∈




The reason why only a subset of all citizens donate to lobbying is that
moderate citizens free ride on the more extreme. The equilibrium contribu-





k = yk is an equilibrium.
Next we perform brief comparative statics on the equilibrium total con-
tribution yk to lobby k, that take into account that yk is not in a closed
form solution, because also q∗k and µ
L
k depend on yk. First of all condi-
tion (qik − q∗k)(qLk − qPk ) ≥ 0 implies that citizens and lobbies are “on the
same side” with respect to the implemented policy, otherwise the contribu-
tion from citizen i to lobby k is zero. Let us assume that (qik − q∗k) > 0
and (qLk − qPk ) > 0. Interestingly the contribution yk depends positively,
under some conditions, on the distance (qLk − qPk ). Indeed moving qLk fur-
ther from qPk increases the contribution yk if (q
i
k − q∗k) remains positive and
qik− q∗k−ρPµLk /(λPk +ρPµLk )(qLk − qPk ) > 0, which is always satisfied if ρPµLk is
relatively small. Under this condition the more extreme is a lobby the more
contribution increases linearly w and the citizen’s monetary cost is convex. The drawback
of this last and more natural formulation is that for internal coherence also the lobby’s
monetary cost would need to be convex, w would then be concave in the lobby’s utility
and the implemented policy q∗ would need to be recomputed.
8A similar result would be obtained defining µLk := b
L
k + φ(yk), where φ(·) is a concave














The comparative statics bring the same results as with φ(·) = √·.
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contributions it will receive. Also the term (qik − q∗k) tells us that the further
is the citizen’s bliss point from the implemented policy the more she con-
tributes to lobbying. yk depends also positively on λ
i
k and negatively on ρ
i
as expected. Thus if λik is low for many citizens there will be a counteracting
effect with respect to the one we focused in proposition 2.1, indeed the lobby
can move the policy closer to her bliss point because citizens do not care a lot
about that topic, but they will also contribute less to lobbying, giving her less
power. If instead the salience of an issue is high for the whole population the
lobby will receive contributions but the politician will not move too much the
implemented policy in the direction of the lobby because citizens care about
it. Therefore the capability of a lobby to move the implemented policy close
to her position depends on the existence of a small group of individuals that
consider an issue very salient, while the majority of citizens does not.
If we have n lobbies in dimension k where each lobby is denoted by jk



















so in each dimension the implemented policy is a convex combination of the
bliss point of the politician and that of lobbies that operate on that issue.
The next condition applies only to individuals who donate in equilibrium.





















if the numerator is positive.
The same reasoning that was applied to the equilibrium contributions with
one lobby per issue tells us that only individuals for which the RHS of equa-
tion 2.20 is the highest donate. The same comparative statics results with
one lobby apply with more than one. Interestingly with more than one lobby
citizens contribute mostly and under some conditions ONLY to the most
extreme lobby. Indeed let us consider the case of just two lobbies 1 and 2,











then in equilibrium citizen i does not contribute to lobby 1. These results
about extremism are given by the fact that the lobby contribution schedule
is a function increasing in the distance between the politician bliss point and
the lobby one. The result does not always hold, indeed if the stated condition
is not valid citizen i could find profitable to contribute to lobby 1, because
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the contribution function
√· is concave, with a decreasing marginal return.
The previous comparative statics take into account that yijk is not in a closed
form solution.
2.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed a voting model where citizens candidates have a ranking
over issues. After elections unidimensional lobbies intervene in order to influ-
ence the politician. They offer contributions contingent to the implemented
policy. We find that interest groups that lobby on dimensions that are less
salient are able to move the implemented policy further from the bliss point
of the politician and closer to their own with respect to interest groups that
intervene in more salient issues.
When studying the entry and voting equilibria of the model, we reduce
the political dimensions to two and add a source of information incomplete-
ness. Voters are of two different types: type 1 gives less importance to the
second issue with respect to type 2. Depending on the position of candidates,
we can have 2-candidates pooling or separating equilibria. Pooling equilib-
ria are particularly interesting, because differently from Besley and Coate
(2001), we have an effect of lobbying on the implemented policy. Indeed, cit-
izens in pooling equilibria do not know the candidate’s type and vote based
on the expected value of the implemented policy. In this way they will offset
too much or too little the work of lobbies. Moreover, in equilibrium there
are citizens with the same most preferred policy that vote for different can-
didates if they are of different types. This result captures the real paradox
of voters that have the same political views, but end up supporting differ-
ent candidates, because they have dissimilar opinions on what is the most
important political issue.
An extension of the model provides citizens with the possibility of giv-
ing monetary contributions to interest groups, partly endogenizing lobbying.
Contributions increase the power of the lobby and its ability to move the
implemented policy towards its bliss point. With more than one lobby per
issue, we find that, under some conditions, only the most extreme lobbies
receive contributions, because the willingness to pay of the lobby increases
with the distance between the politician’s bliss point and the lobby’s one.
Moreover the effectiveness of a lobby is maximized when the salience of an
issue is low for the general population and high for a small group of citizens.
Further research can be done on the same topic. Instead of taking as
exogenous the citizens’ ranking of issues, it would be interesting to consider
a politician or a lobby that can manipulate salience through advertising.
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A politician would like to receive contributions from lobbies with a higher
willingness to pay, thus she could try to lower the salience of issues on which
these lobbies operate. Thus the interaction of lobbying after elections and
the manipulation before could show that in equilibrium interest groups can
be more successful in the political dimensions that were ex ante more relevant
for citizens.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.1: the elected politician P maximizes the utility func-
tion in 2.4, the FOC is: −2λPk (xk − xPk ) − 2ρµk(qk − qLk ) = 0 which put in
a matrix form brings the result in lemma 2.1. The 2nd order conditions are
guaranteed by the concavity of the quadratic function u.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: we assume that there is a continuum of set




a continuous and differentiable function of λj, with both properties guaran-
teed by lemma 2.1. Then we can compute the derivative ∂
∂λj
|q∗Pλj ,j − qLj | =
ρµj |qPj −qLj |
(λj+ρµj)2








Proof of Proposition 2.2: we assume that for all µj ∈ [0, 1] q∗Pµj is an
equilibrium. q∗Pµj is a continuous and differentiable function of µj, with both
properties guaranteed by lemma 2.1. Then we can compute the derivative
∂
∂µj
|q∗Pµj ,j − qLj | = −
λPj ρ|qPj −qLj |
(λj+ρµj)2
< 0. The sign of the derivative proves proposi-
tion 2.2 for all µij, µ
l






Proof of Proposition 2.3: we assume that for all η ≥ 0 q∗Pη is an equilib-
rium. q∗Pη is a continuous and differentiable function of η, with both proper-
ties guaranteed by lemma 2.1. We take P of type 1. Then we can compute
the derivative ∂
∂η







> 0. The sign of the




The same result applies with P of type 2.
Proof of Lemma 2.3: We now provide equilibrium strategies in the vot-
ing subgame for 2 and 3 candidates such that a third candidate never finds
convenient to enter. We do not specify what are the beliefs of voters on the
candidates’ implemented policies, because the proof is valid for every array
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of beliefs that are common to all voters. If C(γ) = {A,B} all non indiffer-
ent citizens vote for their favorite candidate and indifferent citizens do not
vote. This vector of strategies is a subgame Nash equilibrium and does not
include weakly dominated strategies. If C(γ) = {A,B,C}, where A and B’s
expected implemented policies satisfy condition 2.10, and voters face three
candidates9, equilibrium strategies are built as follows: all voters, including
C, that are non indifferent between A and B vote for their favorite candidate
among {A,B}. Voters that are indifferent between A and B but strictly
prefer C to either A or B vote for C. Voters that are indifferent between A
and B but prefer either A or B to C split: half of them vote for A and half
of them vote for B. This vector of strategies is a subgame Nash equilibrium
and does not include weakly dominated strategies. Voters that are not indif-
ferent between A and B do not change their vote because they would make
the other candidate win. Voters that are indifferent between A and B and
strictly prefer C get the same utility in equilibrium voting for A,B,C or not
voting. But voting for C is the only non weakly dominated strategy they
have. Indeed voting for C makes this kind of citizen strictly better off than
voting for A,B or not voting, when there are enough citizens who vote for C
such that she is pivotal. Citizens that are indifferent between A and B and
prefer either A,B to C get the same utility in equilibrium voting for A,B,C
or not voting. Let us assume they vote for A. Voting for A is not weakly
dominated by voting for B, but weakly dominates not voting and voting for
C. If there are enough citizens who vote for C such that this kind of citizen
is pivotal she prefers voting for A (or B) than voting for C or not voting.
The voting equilibrium strategies in the 3 candidates’ subgame are built such
that if A and B were tying when C was not running, they are still tying with
C running, because citizens that are indifferent between A,B either vote for
C or they split equally among A and B. Given these voting equilibrium
strategies, when voters face all 3 candidates, C loses with certainty.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: the voting equilibrium is guaranteed by lemma
2.2, where expected policies are q¯A, q¯B. Now we check if any type of A
and B has an incentive to deviate not entering as a candidate. Condi-




U(q∗Pt , Pt) + U(q¯−P , Pt)
]− c > U(q¯−P , Pt).
Proof of Theorem 2.2: the voting equilibrium is guaranteed by lemma 2.2,
where policies are qAt , qBs . Type t of candidate P runs because ps
2
[U(q∗Pt , Pt)+
U(q−Ps , Pt)]+(1−ps)U(q∗Pt , Pt)−c > psU(q−Ps , Pt)+(1−ps)U(qsq, Pt). Type
−t of candidate P does not run because ps
2
[U(q∗P−t , P−t) + U(q−Ps , P−t)] +
9This specification is needed, because not all candidates could be drawn by Nature.
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(1− ps)U(q∗P−t , P−t)− c < psU(q−Ps , P−t) + (1− ps)U(qsq, P−t). A third can-
didate, that wins against either At or Bs does not find convenient to enter
because pspt
2
[U(q∗At , r) + U(q∗Bs , r)] + (1− ptps)U(q∗r, r) < pspt2 [U(q∗At , r) +
U(q∗Bs , r)] + c + pt(1 − ps)U(q∗At , r) + ps(1 − pt)U(q∗Bs , r) + (1 − ps)(1 −
pt)U(q
sq, r). By 2.3 when facing both candidates r loses for sure. The same
reasoning applies to deviations from third candidates who are winning just
against one candidate between At and Bs, or sure losers.
Proof of Proposition 2.5 The total contribution yk to lobby k that


















where condition 2.21 is derived from the FOC of citizen i’s utility. If the




k), citizen i does not contribute. The equilibrium contribution to
lobby k is maxρ,qk,λk y
M
k , that represents the optimal contribution of citizens
whose idiosyncratic parameters ρ, qk, λk are the arg max of y
M
k . All other





Don’t teach them how to fish:
explaining the heterogeneity in
state capacity in non
settlement colonies
3.1 Introduction
Since Acemoglu et al. (2001) the long lasting effect, in terms ef economic
growth, of colonial institutions on ex colonies is well established. The empir-
ics in Acemoglu et al. (2001) were sustained by the idea that colonizers put
good, growth enhancing institutions, in colonies where they had the possibil-
ity to settle, while extractive institutions were created where no settlement
was possibile, therefore exploitation was the optimal choice. Still in the sub-
set of non settlement colonies, most of the African and Asian ones, there is a
wide heterogeneity in the quality of colonial institutions. This heterogeneity
needs a finer explanation.
This paper develops a theoretical investigation on the strategic behavior of
coloniers in setting up colonial institutions in non settlement colonies. First
the histories of two non settlement colonies, Belgian Congo and Senegal, are
described to show that there is heterogeneity in colonial institutions, even
in non settlement colonies. Moreover, the civil conflict outcome of these
two colonies agrees with an empirical literatures that consistently finds a
negative correlation between high state capacity and civil war. Secondly a
theoretical model is presented, in order to study the equilibrium strategies of
colonizers in choosing investment in state capacity. Indeed, while having high
state capacity can create a productive gain in the colonial economy, it is also
44
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an efficient machine for avoding civil conflict and chaos, once the colonized
take power. Thus creating a modern colonial state makes independence an
attractive outcome for the local groups.
Roughly half of the colonies that got independent after 1945 experienced
episodes of civil conflict. In some of these countries the metropole left such
an institutional setting that civil conflict could not be avoided. Striking in
this direction is the example of Belgian Congo, that became independent
in 1960. Five days after independence a mass-scale civil war was triggered,
leading to 100 000 deaths in five years. The Belgian authorities, since domi-
nation was established in 1885, did not make any attempt to build a modern
and efficient state, that could have given Belgian Congo a chance for self-
government. There was no indigenous council, bureaucracy was managed by
Belgian personnel, there was no Congolese military officer in the Congolose
army, and at the time of independence only 30 Congoleses held a univer-
sity degree. A few years before independence, when all other colonies were
starting to become independent, Belgium proposed a decolonization process
in order to create institutions that Congo needed to survive after indepen-
dence, but Congolese leaders refused. When independence came two regions
seceded, the military mutinied, leaders of different parties plotted against
each other. A complete state failure was avoided only because a self-declared
general named Mobutu won the civil war and began ruling with an iron fist,
erasing the democratic constitution of 1960. An opposite colonial history is
the one of Senegal. Senegal was the first French colony in Africa, in 1848 its
inhabitants gained the possibility of electing a deputy to the French parlia-
ment, the Assemble´e nationale. In the first half of the XXth century Senegal
elected many African deputies. There was an African elite that was educated
in French universities, high schools were created in Senegal, the indigenous
population was part of the bureaucracy and of the political decision making
process in the colony. When independence came in the 1960 the president
Senghor, a politician and intellectual, was elected. He relinquished power to
Diouf in the 1981, who ruled until 2000. The ex colony after independence
experienced low levels of political violence and no civil conflict.
The institutional setting left by the colonizer was clearly different in the
two colonies, and had a strong effect on the civil conflict outcome when the
countries became independent. There is also an empirical literature that
correlates different aspects of state capacity with civil conflict, see Hendrix
(2010). Military personnel per capita, measures of bureaucratic capacity, rule
of law, private property enforcement, fiscal capacity all correlate negatively
with civil conflict onset and the rebel probability of victory, once conflict has
begun.
Given that the quality of state capacity at the time of independence was
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determined by choices taken by the colonizer well before, understanding the
determinants of these choices can be helpful to figure out the determinants
of civil conflict in ex colonies.
Taking into account these considerations, a dynamic game is presented,
where the colonizer strategically chooses to invest in state capacity, in or-
der to create a productive gain in the colonial economy. This investment
reduces the probability of civil conflict after independence in the colony, thus
it increases the incentive of local groups to become independent, choice oth-
erwise costly because of the subsequent civil war. The colonizer, aware of
these dynamics, can also choose investment in a colonial military to crush
independence attempts. In equilibrium the colonizer keeps the local groups
indifferent between fighting for independence and accepting colonial rule.
Equilibrium choices about investment in state capacity and in the military
depend on the magnitude of the productive gain and the cost of the military.
Hence the main message of this theory is that the equilibrium investment in
high state capacity depend on the matching between two identities, the one
of the colonizer and the one of the colony. Indeed the cost of the colonial
military depends on the size of the colonial empire, e.g. France and UK
had a lower average cost of the military, considering scale effects, compared
to Belgium and the Netherlands. At the same time the magnitude of the
productive gain of state capacity investment depends on inherent features of
the colony, for example the presence of natural resources or the distance to
the sea. Moreover when in equilibrium there is investment in state capacity
there is always investment in the military. There are also equilibria where
the metropole does not invest in state capacity, to lower to incentives for the
local groups to become independent and save the cost of military. Indeed if
the colony becomes independent, there would be civil conflict, caused by the
lack of a working state machine, therefore local groups are willing to accept
in equilibrium a large exploitation by the metropole.
The equilibria of this game adapt to the colonial history till 1945. Colonies
were steadily under control of metropoles, that were extracting resources.
There was quite heterogeneity in the colonial institutions set by metropoles
in different colonies. After 1945 many events give rise to the independence
wave of colonies: the end of WWII showed the weakness of the old European
colonizers. US and URSS were becoming global powers willing to extend their
areas of influence in Africa and Asia. The UN was created, article 73 of the
UN charter explicitly stated that colonial powers had to start demobilizing
their empires. In 1960, the so called year of Africa 17 colonies became inde-
pendent, and in the 30 years after 1945 the colonial empires had completely
vanished. Thus an unexpected exogenous shock is added to the previous
model. After choices about military and state capacity have already been
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taken, the shock forces the metropole to leave the colony at the end of the pe-
riod. If the colony has an efficient state machine, the colonial power can only
extract the maximal rent in that period and leave, and the ex colony does not
experience civil conflict thereafter. If instead the colony does not have the in-
stitutions to avoid chaos, the metropole proposes a process of decolonization,
in order to invest in state capacity and prevent civil war after independence.
The metropole takes advantage of the process of decolonization to devise
institutional loopholes that give her a perpetual rent, even after the colony
becomes independent. For example political institutions are designed such
that politicians can be bribed by foreign companies to get favorable terms
for public tenders. Therefore the process of decolonization is costly for the
colony and inefficient. In equilibrium, if the inefficiency of decolonization is
too large, local groups rather become independent immediately, facing the
unavoidable civil conflict. This equilibrium matches the failed decolonization
of Belgian Congo. Thus civil war appears in equilibrium when there had not
been investment in state capacity before and inefficiency of decolonization
is too large. The effect of natural resources on civil conflict is investigated
in the game. The channel goes through the metropole’s incentive to create
state capacity. If the presence of natural resources lowers this incentive, then
a colony with a large natural resources sector is more likely to experience
civil war after independence.
A large economic literature has been developed in these years on colonial
institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) focus on settlement and non settlement
colonies, where in the first ones inclusive economic institutions were created,
while non settlement colonies had extractive institutions. The effect of this
choice is still visible today in the different economic growths of ex colonies.
The focus of this paper is instead only on non settlement colonies, where
all institutions were set for extractive purposes. Still the heterogeneity of
colonial institutions in different colonies, and their effect on civil conflict,
makes it interesting to study the strategic behavior of colonizers in this mat-
ter. The paper of Acemoglu et al. (2001) is also part of a rich debate on the
causal effects of inclusive institutions on economic growth, see also Glaeser
et al. (2004) and Acemoglu et al. (2005). There is been also an increasing
attention in the past years on the strategies that a ruling extractive party
can implement to remain in office. Acemoglu et al. (2004), Miquel (2007),
De Luca et al. (2011) analyze how weak rulers, that do not have strong mil-
itary, use the ethnic and social divisions of a society to withold power. This
paper contributes to this literature analyzing the incentives that an extrac-
tive party has into not investing in state capacity, in order to destroy the
chances of a stable peace in the colony after independence. The literature on
the determinants of civil conflict is too wide to be summarized here. Ethnic,
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linguistic and religious fractionalization, the presence of natural resources,
lack of political representation, wealth inequality are still under study as
possible causes of civil conflict, see Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Samba-
nis (2001), Ross (2006), Reynal-Querol (2002), Buhaug and Rød (2006) and
Humphreys (2005). Thyne (2006) finds that primary and secondary educa-
tion lowers the probability of civil war in a sample of 160 countries from 1980
to 1999. Wantchekon and Garc´ıa-Ponce (2011) test with an IV estimation
the idea that the type of insurgency against colonial rule determined the level
of democracy of ex colonies. The instrument is terrain ruggedness. Specif-
ically rural insurgencies are empirically associated with autocratic regimes,
while urban insurgencies with democracies. The authors also find that rural
insurgencies are also a strong predictor of civil conflict after independence.
The quality of state capacity, in its many facets, is consistently correlated
with civil conflict onset, see Hendrix (2010). There will be a focus on the
literature on state capacity and conflict in the next section.
Berman et al. (2011) focus on the effectiveness of reconstruction and service
provision spending in Iraq in reducing the violence against Coalition forces,
finding a weak negative relation between aid and violence. Berman et al.
(2011) paper raises the question of what are proper tactics that an occupy-
ing force has to implement to prevent civil conflict when occupation is over.
The analysis presented here suggests that looking at colonial institutions and
their effect on failed decolonizations and civil conflicts after independece can
be useful to determine some policy implications.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section the colonial histories
of Belgian Congo and Senegal are presented, along with a review of the
literature on state capacity and civil conflict. Section 3.3 discusses a model of
colonial rule and its equilibria. Section 3.4 studies the effect of an exogenous
shock in the same framework. The results match the independence wave
after 1945. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Stylized facts
Here follows the description of the colonial histories of Belgian Congo and
Senegal. These countries received very different institutional treatments from
their colonizers, and faced opposite civil conflict outcomes after indepen-
dence.
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3.2.1 Belgian Congo
In the 1885 Le´opold II, king of Belgium, conquered Congo with a merce-
nary army, taking over all the kingdoms that were present in the area. The
Congo Free State was created, a de facto private property of Le´opold II. Soon
the Belgian king discovered that Congo was rich in minerals and natural re-
sources, going from copper, diamonds, gold, cobalt to rubber and ivory. In
the 1908 after an international civil rights campaign unraveled the dramatic
conditions of African workers in the mines and plantations of Congo, the Bel-
gian government took over and Congo became an official colony. Forced labor
was formally forbidden, but the extraction of the riches of Congo continued.
The Belgian administration became more concerned with the material
conditions of the African population. Hospitals and primary schools were in-
stituted. The Belgian approach was paternalistic: while the basic needs of the
Congolese were satisfied, there was no willingness to develop self-government,
high education or in any institution that would have given Congo the appear-
ance of a modern state. Till independence in Congo there was no indigenous
parliament, no Congolese officer in the military (Force Publique), and very
few university graduates (in 1960 only 30 Congolese had a degree).
After the Second World War Belgium joined the UN. There was strong
pressure from the international organization on Belgium to start a process of
decolonization. In the 1950 the first Congolese political party was created:
ABAKO, founded by Kasa-vubu and aiming to represent the interests of the
Bakongo ethnicity. In the 1955 a Belgian professor, Antoine Van Bilsen, pub-
lished a “Thirty Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgian Africa”,
Van Bilsen (1956). The proposal started from the realization that Congo
could not become independent right away because there were no institutions
supporting a peaceful transition. In thirty years the Belgian administration
would have taken the responsibility of establishing these institutions and at
the time of independence a sort of Belgian-Congolese commonwealth would
have been created. A public debate on Congolese newspaper started about
this proposal. While a small number of e´volue´s seemed to appreciate the plan,
ABAKO strongly opposed it asking for immediate independence. In the 1956
another party was created, MNC, the Congolese National Movement, whose
leader was Patrice Lumumba. In 1959 violent riots against whites exploded
in Leopoldville, fueled by ABAKO and MNC leaders. The Belgian govern-
ment hoped to buy more time and king Badouin declared that Belgium would
lead Congo to independence, “without undesirable procrastination but also
without undue haste”. A five year decolonization plan was proposed by the
colonial government to the Congolese leaders. While the Belgians underlined
the probability of a Congolese failed state in case of immediate independence,
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Gondola (2003) claims that that the plan was proposed “in order to devise
a constitutional structure that would guarantee a peaceful transfer of power
without depriving Belgium of most of its economic interests in Congo.”
In 1960 a round table conference was organized in Brussels between the
Congolese leaders and the Belgian government to discuss the terms of decol-
onization. Unexpectedly the Congolese leaders united in refusing any decol-
onization plan and asking for immediate independence. The Belgian govern-
ment accepted and on 30 June 1960 Congo became independent. General
elections delivered a parliament divided in two between ABAKO and MNC.
Lumumba became prime minister and Kasa-vubu President. Five days after
independence the army mutinied against its Belgian officers, who had no in-
tention of leaving their post in the short term. In the meanwhile Katanga,
the richest region in terms of minerals, asked for secession, Lumumba decided
to send the army there but no one answered his request in the mutinied mil-
itary. The UN was forced to intervene, unsuccessfully. Also South Kasai
seceded, Kasa-vubu declared Lumumba deposed of his office but the parlia-
ment voted against this decision. A self-declared general named Mobutu,
ordered by Kasa-vubu took Lumumba as a prisoner. Lumumba was tortured
and then killed. The conflict escalated and in five years took around 100000
lives. Mobutu became President in 1965, erasing all democratic institutions
set in the 1960. Today Congo is still being flagellated by civil conflicts.
Congo scores 51 in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
The colonial and postcolonial history of Belgian Congo shows that colonial
institutions mattered for civil conflict after independence. The lack of the
monopoly of violence, caused by the desegregation of the local police force,
the mistrust between the different leaders, and the possibility to extract
political rents, were all factors determining conflict.
Moreover there is a puzzle concerning the decision of the Congolese to
refuse the process of decolonization. The debate on the African newspapers
before 1960 shows that Belgian and Congolese leaders were aware that Congo
was in a risky situation once independence was reached. Diverging interests
of the local groups that belonged to the colony suggested that conflict was un-
avoidable. Then it is a priori unclear why decolonization, that was proposed
in different forms, was refused.
3.2.2 Senegal
The four Senegalese cities of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gore´e, and Rufisque, also
called “Le quatre communes”, were the oldest colonial towns in French Africa.
In 1848 their inhabitants received, first in Africa, the full citizenship mak-
ing them formally equal to French citizens, even though technical barriers
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made this equality only theoretical. On 27 April 1848 the French National
Assembly voted a law that enabled the four quarters to elect a deputy to the
parliament. In 1916 Blaise Degne, the first full-blooded African was elected
to the National Assembly, and from that time on the Senegal deputies were
always African.
France had an economic interest in Senegal because it was a slave trade
port until 1848. In 1895 Senegal was included in the West French Africa
(AOF), which was a federation of eight colonies: Mauritania, Senegal, French
Sudan (now Mali), French Guinea, Coˆte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Upper Volta
(now Burkina Faso), Dahomey (now Benin) and Niger. The capital of the
federation was Dakar in Senegal. Senegalese Africans had a special status
in the confederation. Senegalese deputies were always at the forefront of
the decolonization struggle. After the WWII France started a transfer of
power to the colonies of AOF. Between the 1958 and the 1960 all African
colonies of the AOF through referenda approved by the metropole decided
to become independent. The institutional situation in Senegal at the time
of independence was better than the other colonies in AOF and much better
than Congo: Senegal Africans could access higher education in France. High
schools were spread in the colony. There was a number of associations and
parties that were involved in the policy making process in Senegal in the
previous 30 years, see Chafer (2002).
Elections in the 1960 delivered the presidency to Le´opold Sedar Senghor,
an intellectual and ex African deputy at the French parliament. Power was
retained by Senghor until he handed it over to his picked successor, Abdou
Diouf, in 1981. Even though political activity was restricted and Senghor’s
party, the Senegalese Progressive Union (now the Socialist Party of Senegal),
was the only legally permitted party until 1973, Senghor was considerably
more tolerant of opposition than most African regimes became in the 1960s.
Today Senegal is a peaceful and relatively democratic country, scoring 16 in
the Ibrahim Index of African Governance.
3.2.3 State capacity and civil conflict
State capacity is a general concept that has been conceptualized in different
ways, in the international relations literature and the economic literature.
The broader definition of state capacity is ”the ability of a government to
administer its territory effectively”, Walder (1995). The three key dimensions
of state capacity are coercive capacity, extractive capacity, and administra-
tive capacity. Coercive or military capacity is the ability of state to repel
challenges to its authority with force. Military capacity, usually measured as
military personnel per capita, is associated with lower likelihood of civil con-
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flict onset and rebel defeat, see Mason and Fett (1996), Mason et al. (1999),
Hegre and Sambanis (2006), De Rouen and Sobek (2004). Indeed a state
with a stronger military will be more likely to deter insurgencies attempts,
either to take over the central government, or to secede.
Extractive capacity represents the ability of a state to tax its population.
Extractive capacity is the main focus of the economic literature on state ca-
pacity, see North and Thomas (1976), Besley and Persson (2007). Relative
political capacity, defined as the ratio of actual tax revenue to expected tax
revenue, is shown to be negatively correlated with civil conflict onset at the
geographical core of the state, see Buhaug (2010).
Administrative capacity includes two different interrelated aspects of state
capacity: the quality of state bureaucracy and the quality of the rule of law.
These two indicators of state capacity show to be negatively correlated with
civil conflict onset, see De Rouen and Sobek (2004) and Fearon (2005). Bu-
reaucratic capacity gives to the government the possibility to monitor the
population, to gain information about the identity of possible rebels. The
quality of the rule of law, that is the ability of the state to make credible
commitments to private investors, acts on the incentives of individuals to
invest productively, instead of challenging state authority.
All the dimensions of state capacity are empirically negatively correlated
with civil conflict onset. In the following model, by assumption, when there
has not been investment in state capacity, and the colony for some rea-
sons becomes independent, civil conflict between the local groups cannot be
avoided. This rule of the game is common knowledge of colonizers and colo-
nized. This assumption is justified by the idea that, even though colonizers
and local groups could not be aware of the empirical literature on the topic,
they knew that having a more efficient state machine meant less probability
of chaos and state failure. This awareness was evident in the debate about
decolonization in the Belgian Congo, where the decolonization process was
needed to avoid state failure after independence.
3.3 The model
There are n+ 1 players in the game: n local groups, i ∈ N = {1, ..., n}, and
a colonial power/metropole: m. The game is played on an infinite horizon
in a discrete time. 0 ≤ t < ∞ denotes period t. In every period t local
group i produces y¯i inelastically with respect to taxation and constant in
time, y :=
∑
i∈N y¯i. In every period there is a rent coming from natural
resources r. Production and extraction of natural resources take place before
any action is taken by the players. This 2-sector economy depends on the
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level of state capacity h ∈ {0, 1}. Y (h) = (1 + x(h))y + (1 − bx(h))r is the
output as a function of the level of state capacity, with x(1) = x, x(0) = 0.
x > 0 is the productivity gain and b is a parameter that determines the
effect of state capacity investment on the natural resources sector. If b > 0
there is a negative effect on the natural resources sector, that can depend on
the relocation of workers from the natural resources to the modern sector,
due to change in their education level, that is included in the investment in
state capacity. If b < 0 also the natural resources sector gains from state
capacity investment. If b = 0 the natural resources sector is untouched by
state capacity investment. In any case b has a lower bound: b > −1, so the
productivity gain is always stronger for the modern sector with respect to the
natural resources one. When the state machine is working efficiently, there is
a side effect: in the event of independence no chaos arises and no civil conflict
is triggered. If the level of state capacity is low when independence comes,
the outcome is civil war1. m is in power in the colony. In period 0 m chooses
to invest in state capacity, h ∈ {0, 1}. There is no direct cost of state capacity
investment2. At the same time m also chooses if investing (i) or not (ni) in
a stable army. This choice is denoted by φ ∈ {i, ni}. The army has a per
period cost p. In period t > 0 m chooses a redistribution to perform between
the n + 1 players, through taxation and transfers. There is no inefficiency







the post tax aggregate income accruing to group i ∈ {1, ..., n}, ytm is the rent




i+ym = Y (h). No group i can receive
less than a subsistence level: yi ≥ yi. Thus, there is an upperbound on the
rent ytm extracted by the colonial power: ym ≤ Y (h)−y, where y :=
∑n
i=1 yi.
In period 0 redistribution is performed after (h, φ) have been determined. In
period t ≥ 0, after taxation and redistribution are implemented, the local
groups can pick one action among the following:
 accept the colonial rule (a);
 rebel (w) against the metropole m.
1Thus the probability of civil conflict after independence is 0 with high state capacity,
and 1 without it. It could instead be assumed that the probability XE of civil conflict
after independence, with a high level of state capacity, is lower than the same probability
XNE , with a low level: XNE > XE . The equilibrium outcomes would not change with
this assumption.
2Adding a positive cost would not change the results, because if there is investment
in state capacity, there must be always investment in the military to avoid a costless
independence for the local groups. Therefore in the game only the cost of the military is
considered, to save on the number of parameters.
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This choice is denoted by νti ∈ {a, w}. If at least one local group chooses νti =
w war is triggered, all local groups form a coalition against the metropole.
The game enters the political state W , war of independence. W depends on





 if h = 1, φ = ni, the metropole has no military and cannot stop an
insurgency. The colony becomes independent without the cost of in-
surgency. A high level of state capacity guarantees no civil conflict and
a fair redistribution among the social groups. Specifically the redistri-
bution is a result of a Nash bargaining, where the status quo is the
vector of payoffs that make all local groups indifferent between a and
w, in this case (yt1, ..., y
t
n). Income after tax of local groups in period t
is redistributed too.
 If h = 0, φ = ni the metropole has no military. The colony becomes
independent without the cost of insurgency, and the metropole leaves
the colony with ym. There is a low level of state capacity, thus chaos
arises and local groups can only trigger conflict with each other. Each










the higher is the cost of conflict. The winning group enjoys the total
output from period t on, minus the part extracted by the metropole
and the cost of civil conflict.
 If h = 0, φ = i the metropole reacts with the military to the insurgency.
With probability 1/2 the metropole represses the rebellion, with the
same probability the local groups win and the metropole has to leave
the colony, guaranteeing independence3. The cost of insurgency for
group i is syti > 0, 0 < s < 1. If independence is achieved, with a low
level of state capacity, local groups trigger a civil conflict with the same
features described in the previous point, where the cost of civil conflict
is c(1− s)∑n1=1 yti .
 If h = 1, φ = i the metropole starts a war with local groups, with
the same features described previously. If independence is achieved the
presence of a working state machine prevents civil conflict. Redistri-
bution is performed through a Nash bargaining, where the status quo
is the vector of payoffs that make all local groups indifferent between
a and w.
3Adding a parameter for the probability of repression, instead of considering it fixed
to 1/2, does not deliver any interesting insight on the results.
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If all local groups choose νti = a, or if the colonial power represses the insur-
gency, next period starts with the metropole still ruling.
The timing in period t can be summarized as follows:
1. (only in period 0) the metropole m decides about investment in state
capacity (h) and in the military (φ);
2. production (1+x(h))y and extraction of natural resources (1− bx(h))r
are performed;





4. each local group i ∈ N chooses between accepting the colonial rule a
and rebel w.
If all local groups choose a period t + 1 starts with the metropole m still in
power. Otherwise the outcome of the political state war of independence W




m), as previously described.
3.3.1 Results
The characterization of equilibria focuses on pure strategy Markov perfect
equilibria (MPE) of the game, which are a mapping from the current state of
the game to strategies, where the last ones form a subgame perfect equilib-
rium. The investigation of MPE is performed through backward induction.
In this section time subscripts are dropped.
Local groups: accept colonial rule or rebel?
After the metropole has decided about the investment in state capacity h,
in the military φ and redistribution (y1, ..., yn, ym), each local group has to
decide if accepting colonial domination and move to the next period, or
rebel. Thus the subgames are defined by choices h, φ, (y1, ..., yn, ym) of the
metropole in the upper part of the game. Next follows the analysis of the
strategic decision of local groups about rebellion or acceptance of colonial
rule.
If h = 1, φ = ni there has been investment in state capacity, thus there
is a larger output Y (1), and no civil conflict in case of independence. The
colonial power has not created a military, so local groups can get independent
without paying the cost of insurgency. Given that there is no cost in becoming
independent,and since under colonial rule the metropole takes a positive rent
ym, independence can ensure to each local group an income per period that
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is higher than the one under colonial rule. Thus every local group always
prefers to rebel. Formally group i accepts colonial rule, νi = a, if the present
value of receiving yi in every period is larger than the share of the present
value of output in this period and in the future, minus the rent ym extracted
by the metropole:
1
1− β yi ≥ ki
[
1
1− βY (1)− ym
]
,
where ki is defined by the Nash bargaining. The inequalities for i = 1, ..., n
are all satisfied if the surplus from bargaining is less or equal to 0, that is
ym = 0, considering that there is no cost in becoming independent.
Proposition 3.1 (h = 1, φ = ni). In the subgame where the metropole has
invested in state capacity (h = 1) but it has not created a military (φ = ni) all
local groups accept the colonial rule (νi = a, i = 1, ..., n) if and only if ym = 0
in every period. If ym > 0 all local groups choose νi = w, independence
is achieved and no civil conflict arises. The surplus from independence is
β/(1− β)ym.
If h = 0, φ = ni the level of state capacity is low and there is no military.
Thus if local group i chooses νi = w the colony becomes independent without
the cost of insurgency. In the neo-independent country chaos arises, so local
groups are bound to trigger conflict with each other. In this case local groups
face two costly choices: remain under colonial rule losing the extracted rent
ym in every period, or rebel and embark in a civil war that destroys part of
the output of the colony. A large ym, extracted by the metropole, can thus
induce local groups to become independent and pay the cost of civil conflict
thereafter. For the same reason, if the cost of civil conflict is too high, local
groups are willing to accept colonial rule even though the exploitation on
the side of the metropole is substantial. Therefore for the metropole in the
upper part of the game it is important to know what is the maximum ym
that can be extracted, without making any local group choose to rebel. It is
useful to notice that m cannot advantage only one group in the redistribution,
because civil war needs only one group to trigger it, thus every local groups
must prefer colonial rule to rebellion. Formally local group i chooses a if
1











On the RHS 1/n is the probability of winning the civil war, ym is subtracted
only in the present period because in the following periods the metropole
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will have left. Independence is achieved if at least one group chooses w,
thus all the inequalities, for i = 1, ..., n, must be satisfied. The RHS of the
inequality does not depend on i, thus the sum of the RHS of every inequality,
for i = 1, ..., n, divided by 1/(1− β), and by n, gives the condition for yi.
Proposition 3.2 (h = 0, φ = ni). In the subgame where the metropole
has not invested in state capacity (h = 0) and it has not created a military
(φ = ni) all local groups accept the colonial rule (νi = a, i = 1, ..., n) if and
only if
yi ≥ βY (0)
n[(1− β)c+ β] , i = 1, ...n, (3.1)
that implies ym ≤ (1−β)cY (0)/[(1−β)c+β]. If inequality 3.1 is not satisfied
for at least one group i, that group chooses νi = w, independence is achieved
and a civil conflict starts. The winner is selected with probability 1/n and
enjoys all the output from the present period, minus the rent ym extracted by
the colonial power, minus the cost of conflict.
It is convenient for the analysis that follows to give the following defini-
tion: A(c, β) := (1−β)c/[(1−β)c+β]. A(c, β) is the maximum proportion of
output Y (0) that can be extracted in every period by the metropole, under
the condition of inducing every local group to accept colonial rule. A de-
pends positively on c, because the higher the cost of conflict is for the local
groups, the lower is their incentive to get independent, and the larger is the
rent that can be expropriated by the colonial power.
If h = 1, φ = i there are both investment in a military and in state
capacity. Thus if local groups want independence they have to mount an
insurgency against the metropole. Insurgency is costly and does not guaran-
tee that independence is achieved. If the colony becomes independent a high
level of state capacity ensures that civil conflict is not triggered. Also in this
subgame local groups face two costly choices: either to lose in every period
the rent ym that the metropole extracts, or to mount a costly and uncertain
insurgency against the colonial power. Local groups only save the cost of
civil war after independence. The colonial power cannot favor one group or a
small set of local groups in the redistribution, because insurgency needs just
one local group to be triggered. Group i chooses a when
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1− β yi + (1− s)yi
]
,
where on the RHS with probability 1/2 the insurgency is successful and the
present value of the output in every period is split among local groups fairly,
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minus the rent ym extracted by the metropole, minus the cost of insurgency
for all the groups. With probability 1/2 the insurgency is defeated and local
group i can enjoy only (1−s)yi and the present value of future redistribution
from the metropole. The one shot deviation property is applied. ki is defined
by the Nash bargaining.
Proposition 3.3 (h = 1, φ = i). In the subgame where the metropole has
invested in state capacity (h = 1) and a military (φ = i), all local groups
accept the colonial rule (νi = a, i = 1, ..., n) if and only if
yi ≥ βY (1)
n[(1− β)2s+ β] , i = 1, ...n, (3.2)
that implies ym ≤ (1 − β)2sY (1)/[(1 − β)2s + β]. If condition 3.2 is not
satisfied for at least an i, all groups choose νi = w, the insurgency starts.
With probability 1/2 the insurgents win, the colony becomes independent,
output is redistributed fairly and no civil conflict arises. With probability
1/2 the metropole wins and the next period starts with the colony still under
foreign rule.
It is convenient for the analysis that follows to give the following defini-
tion: B(s, β) := (1 − β)2s/[(1 − β)2s + β], where B(s, β) is the maximum
proportion of output Y (1) that the metropole can extract in every period,
under the condition of inducing local groups to accept colonial rule. B de-
pends positively on s, because a higher cost of insurgency lowers the incentive
of the local groups to rebel, highering the rent that the colonial power can
extract in every period.
If h = 0, φ = i the level of state capacity is low, but the metropole
creates a military. Choosing w bears two costs for the local groups: the cost
of insurgency and the cost of civil war if independence is achieved. Thus local
groups face a very high cost in choosing rebellion. Local group i chooses a
if:
1















1− β yi + (1− s)yi
]
.
The coefficient [s+ c(1− s)] takes into account that in case the insurgency is
successful and group i wins also the subsequent civil conflict, the total cost
for the winner includes the cost of insurgency and the cost of civil conflict.
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Proposition 3.4 (h = 0, φ = i). In the subgame where the metropole has
not invested in state capacity (h = 0) but it has created a military (φ = i),
all local groups accept colonial rule (νi = a, i = 1, ..., n) if and only if
yi ≥ βY (0)
n[(1− β)(2s+ (1− s)c) + β] , (3.3)
that implies ym ≤ (1 − β)(2s + (1 − s)c)Y (0)/[(1 − β)(2s + (1 − s)c) +
β]. If condition 3.3 is not satisfied for at least a group i, insurgency is
triggered, if the local groups win the colony becomes independent but a civil
war starts. With probability 1/n one group wins, it enjoys the present value
of output, minus the rent ym extracted by the colonial power, minus the cost
of insurgency and civil war.
It is convenient for the following analysis to define C(c, s, β) := (1 −
β)(2s + (1 − s)c)/[(1 − β)(2s + (1 − s)c) + β]. C(c, s, β) is the maximum
proportion of output Y (0) that the metropole can extract in every period,
under h = 0, φ = i. C depends both on the cost of insurgency s and the cost
of civil war after independence c, and is increasing in both. Moreover C is
always larger or equal than B and A, so the metropole always appropriates
a larger proportion when choosing h = 0, φ = ni, because two conflicts are
always costlier than one. This ensures that the maximum rent ym extracted
by m is larger if h = 0, φ = i, than the same rent under h = 0, φ = ni,
because CY (0) ≥ AY (0). C ≥ B does not guarantee that the maximum
rent ym under h = 0, φ = i is larger than the rent under h = 1, φ = i,
because CY (0) is compared to BY (1), where Y (1) > Y (0).
The metropole: investment in state capacity and/or military?
Next follows the investigation of the strategic decision of the metropole, about
investment in state capacity h, military φ and redistribution (y1, ..., yn, ym).
As underlined in the characterization of the subgame equilibria the colonial
power can extract different maximal ym, based on h and φ. Indeed if h = 1,
φ = ni the maximum rent extracted is ym = 0, if h = 0, φ = ni the
highest ym is A(c, β)Y (0), if h = 1, φ = i the upperbound for the rent is
ym = B(s, β)Y (1), and finally if h = 0, φ = i at most the metropole can take
in every period ym = C(c, s, β)Y (0). When φ = i the colonial power includes
in her payoff the per period cost p for the military.
To avoid considering the case of a metropole that in equilibrium leaves the
colony in period 0, because the other choices are costlier than the outside
option ym = Y (·)− y, some assumptions are added on the parameters.
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Assumption 3.1.
Y (0)− y < 1
1− βA(c, β)Y (0) <
1
1− β (Y (0)− y), (3.4)
Y (1)− y < 1




1− β (Y (1)− y), (3.5)
Y (0)− y < 1




1− β (Y (0)− y). (3.6)
The first inequality in 3.4 implies that not investing in state capacity,
nor in the military, is better for the metropole than taking the maximum
rent in one period and induce local groups to rebel. The second inequality
in 3.4 implies that, with a low level of state capacity and no military, and
if local groups are left with their subsistence levels of income, at least one
local group chooses w. The rationale behind this second inequality is that
ym = AY (0) is the maximum rent that makes local groups indifferent between
accepting colonial rule and rebel. If this rent ym is larger than Y (0)− y, the
metropole can take all the extractable output in the colony without inducing
local groups into rebellion. Conditions 3.5 and 3.6 control for the same choice
respectively under h = 1, φ = i and h = 0, φ = i.
After stating assumption 3.1, the characterization of MP equilibria of the
game is done comparing the metropole’s payoffs under different choices of h
and φ. First of all, in equilibrium, the metropole never chooses to invest in
state capacity (h = 1) but not in the military (φ = ni), because it gives the
colonial power in every period a rent ym = 0, which is always lower than the
outside option: ym = Y (0) − y. For this reason in assumption 3.1 actions
h = 1, φ = ni were not considered.
While the full characterization of equilibria is left to the following theo-
rem, it can be useful to provide the rationale behind the conditions for the
equilibrium, where the metropole chooses h = 1 and φ = i. The colonial
power chooses to invest in state capacity (h = 1) and to create a military
(φ = i), if the largest rent ym that can be appropriated under the condition
of preventing the local groups from rebelling, minus the cost of military, gives
a higher utility than all other options. For example the metropole prefers
h = 1, φ = i to h = 0, φ = i if
1




1− βC(c, s, β)Y (0)−
1
1− βp.
where on the RHS the metropole considers the largest ym taken under h =
0, φ = i, minus the cost of military. What matters in comparing these two
choices is not the cost of military, because it is the same for both, but the
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proportions of output that can be appropriated (B < C) and the magnitude
of the output (Y (1) > Y (0)), that depends on the productive gain x. The
metropole prefers h = 1, φ = i to h = 0, φ = 0 if
1




1− βA(c, β)Y (0).
The colonial power prefers investing in state capacity and in the military,
with respect to not investing in neither of them, when the increase in output
determined by efficient institutions is large enough compared to the cost
of military. Indeed this inequality depends on p and x. The two previous
conditions together define the set of parameters such that h = 1, φ = i is an
equilibrium. The choice of h = 1, φ = i is not compared to h = 1, φ = ni
because the latter is never an equilibrium, while assumption 3.1 ensures that
investment in state capacity and a military is better than extracting Y (1)−y
and leave the colony.
The following theorem states the conditions on the parameters for the
different equilibria. To keep the theorem concise only the metropole’s rent
ym is expressed in equilibrium. There are many redistributions (y1, ..., yn)
with the same ym that correspond to an equilibrium under different actions
(h, φ), e.g. yi = [Y (·)− ym]/n, i = 1, ..., n.
Theorem 3.1. The metropole’s actions h = 0, φ = ni, metropole’s stable
rent ym = A(c, β)(y + r), and local groups’ actions ν
i = a, i = 1, ..., n, is a
MPE of the game if :
p > B(s, β)[y + r + x(y − br)]− A(c, β)(y + r) (3.7)
p > [C(c, s, β)− A(c, β)](y + r). (3.8)
The metropole’s actions h = 1, φ = i, metropole’s stable rent ym = B(s, β)[y+
r + x(y − br)], and local groups’ actions νi = a, i = 1, ..., n, is a MPE of the
game if:
C(c, s, β)(y + r) < B(s, β)[y + r + x(y − br)] (3.9)
p < B(s, β)[y + r + x(y − br)]− A(c, β)(y + r).(3.10)
The metropole’s actions h = 0, φ = i, metropole’s stable rent ym = C(s, β)(y+
r), and local groups’ actions νi = a, i = 1, ..., n, is a MPE of the game if
conditions 3.7-3.10 are not satisfied. The couple of actions h = 1, φ = ni is
never part of an equilibrium.
The following corollary gives a characterization of the previous theorem,
focusing on the parameters (x, p, r). Dependencies on c, s, β are dropped
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from A,B,C. p∗(r) is defined as follows: p∗(r) = [C − A](y + r). x∗(r) and
p(x, r) are defined as follows: x∗(r) = [C − B](y + r)/[B(y − br)], p(x, r) =
B(y − br)x+ [B − A](y + r). p∗(r) solves with equality condition 3.8, x∗(r)
solves condition 3.9. p(x, r) solves with equality condition 3.7.
Corollary 3.1. The metropole in equilibrium invests in state capacity, and
in the military, if p < p(x, r) and x > x∗(r). The metropole in equilibrium
does not invest in state capacity, nor in the military, when p > p(x, r) and
p > p∗(r). If x < x∗(r), p < p∗(r) the colonial power does not invest in
state capacity, but it does invest in the military. The metropole, in equilib-
rium, never chooses to invest in state capacity but not in the military. In all
equilibria local groups are kept indifferent between accepting colonial rule and
rebel.
Figure 3.1: The Markov Perfect equilibria of the game in the (x, p) space
There are some points that can be useful to underline, in light of the
characterization of the equilibria.
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First of all the equilibrium choice of investing in state capacity, that is
the main concern of this paper, depends on two parameters: the productiv-
ity gain from state capacity investment, and the cost of the military. The
former parameter can be attributed to features of the colony, for example
the distance from the sea, or as endogenized in the model, the presence of
natural resources. The magnitude of the latter parameter depends on the
identity of the colonizer. Indeed a colonizer with a larger empire, considering
scale effects in military technology and the possibility to move troops around
the colonies, will have a lower average cost of the military. Therefore the
heterogeneity in institutional quality in non settlement colonies depends on
the matching between two identities, the one of colony and the one of the
colonizer.
Secondly, when there is investment in state capacity there is always, also,
investment in a military to suppress insurgencies, otherwise the local groups
can get independent at no cost, choice that they would always take.
Thirdly, if the military cost is high enough compared to the productivity
gain from state capacity investment (p > p(x, r)), and p is above a threshold
p∗, the metropole does not invest in state capacity, nor in the military. The
colonial power is ready to sacrifice a productivity gain, in order to save the
cost of military. The metropole acts in this way because not modernizing the
state burns the chances of a stable peace in the colony after independence,
making independence excessively costly for the local groups. This dynam-
ics are similar to the reasoning that brings a military commander to burn
the fields and destroy all the supplies in order to slow down the enemy. The
metropole prefers to lose the productivity gain in order to lower the opportu-
nity cost of accepting foreign rule. Mimicking the name given to this military
strategy, this equilibrium action can be defined as “scorched earth” strategy.
Moreover this equilibrium shows that it is possible for an extractive party to
control a country without the use of organized violence.
Furthermore, as anticipated in first point, brief comparative statics show
that increasing the rent from natural resources r can reduce the set of pa-
rameters in which h = 1, if b, the effect of investment in state capacity on the
natural resources sector, is positive. If b > 0 both x∗(r) and p(x, r) change
with r, tightening the set of parameters in which the equilibrium action is
h = 1. If b = 0 only x∗(r) suffers the tightening effect. If b is large and
negative both x∗(r) and p(x, r) change with r, enlarging the set of param-
eters in which the equilibrium action is h = 1. Hence if the effect of state
capacity investment on natural resources is negative, having a larger natural
resources sector makes it less likely to invest in state capacity in equilibrium.
This result will bring more consequences when analyzing the equilibria after
the shock.
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3.4 An exogenous shock
An extension of the model is presented here, to take into account the in-
dependence wave after the 1945, in which metropoles were almost at once
forced the demobilize their colonial empires. At time v > 0 an exogenous
and unpredicted shock forces the metropole to leave the colony4. The shock
is revealed at the beginning of the period. Y (h) is produced, m redistributes




m). If at the beginning of period v, h is equal to 1, local groups
get immediately independent and redistribution is performed as previously
described. If h = 0, the metropole proposes a decolonization process, know-
ing that it has to leave at the end of the period. Decolonization implies the
creation of a working state machine, h = 1, by the colonizer, in exchange for
an institutional setting for the new independent country, such that the ex
metropole can get involved in economic activities with the ex colony. These
economic activities give m a rent z in every period and subtract z¯ to the colo-
nial output available to the local groups. ϕ is defined as follows: ϕ = z¯ − z.
If ϕ > 0 decolonization is inefficient. Each local group can either:
 accept the decolonization process (d);
 get immediately independent (f).
This choice is denoted by η ∈ {f, d}. If all local groups choose d the de-
colonization process D starts. From the next period on z is subtracted to
the total output of the ex colony. After the metropole leaves in period v,
redistribution is performed according to a Nash bargaining, where the status
quo is the vector of payoffs that make local groups indifferent between d and
f . The redistribution involves also the post tax income of local groups in
period v.
z¯ and z are assumed to be fixed, which means that local groups and the
metropole cannot bargain over the terms of decolonization. The reason of
this modeling choice lies in the idea that the colonial power in the process of
decolonization is involved in the design of political and economic institutions
of the future independent country. In order to receive a perpetual rent after
independence there must be a loophole in these new institutions, such that
the metropole can take advantage of it. For example political institutions
are designed such that politicians can be bribed by foreign companies to
get favorable terms for public tenders. But once these institutions are in
4While some colonies, as Indochina, India and Algeria, anticipated the wave and ac-
tively fought against the colonizer, the high number of colonies that became independent
in the 1960 suggests that, for most of the colonies, the push for independence was not
generated endogenously, but came as a shock.
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place the ex colonial power has always an incentive to extract the maximal
possible rent, because there is no third party enforcing any previous contract.
ϕ captures the magnitude of all the inefficiencies of this process.
3.4.1 Results
If an exogenous and unpredictable shock at time v forces the metropole to
leave the colony at the end of the period, different equilibria arise, based on
the value of h, capturing the level of state capacity in period 0. If h = 1
the output of the colony is Y (1) > Y (0), but more importantly civil conflict
between the local groups is avoided after independence. Thus, if the level of
state capacity is already high, the metropole can only extract a rent ym and
leave the country. In equilibrium the rent extracted will be the maximum:
ym = Y (1)−y. Independence is achieved and the present value of the output
minus the metropole’s rent, 1/(1− β)Y (1)− ym, is redistributed fairly.
If h = 0 the metropole redistributes (y1, ..., yn, ym) and proposes a process
of decolonization to the local groups. Both decolonization on one side, and
immediate independence and civil conflict on the other, are costly for the
local groups, the first implies a perpetual loss z¯ for the economy of the ex
colony, while the second destroys part of the present output of the colony.
Formally local group i accepts the decolonization process, ηi = d, if the share
of the present value of future output Y (1) and present output Y (0), minus
the cost of decolonization z¯, minus the metropole’s rent ym, is larger than

















Summing condition 3.11 for all groups i = 1, ..., n determines the maximum
ym the metropole can extract in period v:
ym ≤ y¯m := β(Y (1)− Y (0)− z¯) + (1− β)cY (0)
(1− β)c . (3.12)
Another assumption is made, to make sure that the rent y¯m that makes
local groups indifferent between accepting decolonization and refusing it, is
lower than the total extractable rent Y (0)−y. Otherwise local groups accept
decolonization for every feasible ym.
Assumption 3.2.
y¯m < Y (0)− y. (3.13)
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Considering condition 3.12 the metropole can either choose to take the
maximum ym that induces local groups to accept decolonization, or take the
outside option Y (0)− y, aware of the fact that local groups, for assumption
3.2, will refuse decolonization. Thus decolonization is successful if
y¯m +
βz
1− β ≥ Y (0)− y.
The equilibrium condition for successful decolonization depends on the inef-
ficiency from decolonization ϕ = z¯ − z:
Theorem 3.2. If h = 1 the metropole in equilibrium extracts ym = Y (1)−y,
the country becomes independent and a fair redistribution is performed. No
civil conflict arises. If h = 0 the metropole’s rent ym = y¯
m and local groups’
actions ηi = d, i = 1, ..., n, is a MPE of the game after the shock if
ϕ ≤ x(y − br) + 1− β
β
y − (1− c)z. (3.14)
Under condition 3.14 the decolonization is successful and no civil conflict
arises after independence, but the colony remains trapped in a neocolonialistic
domination. If condition 3.14 is not satisfied the decolonization process fails,
the metropole leaves extracting the maximum rent ym = Y (0)− y, the colony
becomes independent and a civil conflict is triggered between the local groups.
Theorem 3.2 highlights that civil conflict after independence in equilib-
rium depends on two main factors: the investment in state capacity h pre-
vious to the shock, and the inefficiency of decolonization ϕ. If the colonial
power decides to invest in state capacity, there will be no civil conflict in
equilibrium after independence. Hence the conditions under which invest-
ment in state capacity takes place in theorem 3.1 are sufficient to determine
a peaceful cohabitation after independence.
Instead for the set of parameters such that in theorem 3.1 in equilibrium
there was no investment in state capacity, the inefficiency of decolonization
ϕ determines if there is civil conflict after independence. In particular, if
ϕ > ϕ∗(r) := x(y − br) + 1−β
β
y − (1 − c)z, the decolonization process is not
successful, the level of state capacity stays low, and civil conflict is triggered
after independence.
Thus the exogenous shock can also determine civil conflict in equilibrium.
This result can be interesting, because this shock mimics the decolonization
and independence wave after 1945, in particular in the so called “year of
Africa”, the 1960. The United Nations were particularly engaged in pres-
suring the colonial powers to give up their colonies. Many of these colonies
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experienced civil conflict after independence, in some cases only after few
days. Therefore the pressure of the UN, instead of being helpful in increasing
the welfare of the subjected populations through independence, sometimes
in a heterogony of ends has determined an unwanted and costly outcome for
the ex colonies.
Even the possibility of a decolonization process to build the institutions
the ex colony will need to be peaceful, can be useless if there is no third
party providing a commitment device for the metropole and the local groups.
Indeed the metropole cannot guarantee that she will not take advantage of
the decolonization process to devise institutional loopholes that will provide
her with a perpetual rent. If the inefficiency brought by this process is too
high then local groups can prefer to become immediately independent and
face a costly civil conflict. Indeed Belgian Congo followed this equilibrium
path.
Additionally the identity of the colonizer influences the transition to inde-
pendence: colonies dominated by metropoles with a lower cost of the military
are more likely to receive a working state machine, thus they do not end up
in a civil war.
Another interesting point is connected to the comparative statics on the
natural resources sector size r in the previous section. In inequality 3.14 an
increase in r, if b > 0, tightens the constraints on ϕ, reducing the set of
parameters such that there is no civil conflict in equilibrium. The reason
is that, if investment in state capacity has a negative effect (b > 0) on
the natural resources sector, then for a colony rich in natural resources the
productivity gain, consequent to decolonization, is low and local groups could
prefer independence with low state capacity. This effect adds to the ones in
the previous section, where it was showed that an increase in r, if b > 0,
reduced the set of parameters such that h = 1, that in the post shock game
translates into no civil conflict after independence.
Finally theorem 3.2 predicts path divergence in equilibrium: colonies that
received a high level of state capacity, had also a productivity gain (higher
growth), and no conflict, so no waste of human and physical resources. The
ones where the colonizer did not invest in state capacity, did not receive the
productivity gain (lower growth) and also suffered a costly civil conflict after
independence. Next corollary summarizes the results of this section:
Corollary 3.2. Civil conflict after independence is triggered in equilibrium
if:
p > p(x, r), x < x∗(r), ϕ > ϕ∗(r),
where p is the cost of military, x is the productivity gain from state capacity
investment, ϕ is the inefficiency from decolonization, and r is the size of
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the natural resources sector. In this case colonies become independent with
a low state capacity investment. In particular local groups rationally choose
to induce civil conflict in the neo-independent country because decolonization
is too costly for them. Increasing natural resources r, if the effect of state
capacity investment on the natural resources sector is negative, higher the
probability of civil conflict in the ex colony. Thus natural resources influence
civil conflict indirectly.
There is no civil conflict after independence in equilibrium if either there was
investment in state capacity before the shock, or if decolonization is not too
inefficient.
Colonies take divergent growth paths, based on the features of their economies
(x) and the identity of the metropole (p): the ones that received a high state
capacity in equilibrium, have a productivity gain and higher growth and no
civil conflict after independence, the ones that did not receive state capacity
investment face lower growth and costly civil conflict.
3.5 Conclusion
Starting from the colonial histories of Belgian Congo and Senegal, and from
an empirical literature about the correlation between the level of state ca-
pacity and civil conflict, a model about the strategic behavior of metropoles
in setting colonial institutions is developed. In equilibrium the colonizer’s
decision about the investment in state capacity is based on the cost of the
colonial military and on the productive gain of state capacity investment
in the colonial economy. The matching between the identity of the colo-
nizer, which embeds a particular cost of the military, and the identity of the
colony, defining a particular productivity gain, determines the equilibrium
investment in state capacity.
One interesting equilibrium arises, if the productive gain is low compared
to the cost of the military. In this case the metropole does not invest in state
capacity, nor in the military. Therefore the colonizer is willing to sacrifice a
productive gain in order to destroy the possibility of peace in case of indepen-
dence, thus lowering the incentive of the local groups in the colony to become
independent. This strategy has been named ”scorched earth” strategy, be-
cause it recalls the military decision of burning fields and supplies belonging
to the protected population, in order to higher the cost for the invader.
An exogenous shock is added to the game, after decisions about state
capacity and military have already taken place. The metropole is forced to
leave the colony at the end of the period. The shock models the independence
wave after 1945. If there had been investment in state capacity before the
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shock, the colony becomes independent and no civil conflict arises. Other-
wise the colonial power proposes a decolonization process to the local groups
in the colony. Decolonization gives a working state machine to local groups,
thus no civil conflict after independence, but it delivers also a perpetual rent
to the metropole. In equilibrium local groups can be induced to refuse decol-
onization, if the decolonization process is too inefficient. Moreover colonies
take divergent paths: the ones that receive high state capacity enjoy the
productive gain and have no civil conflict after independence, the ones with
low state capacity do not receive the productive gain and face a costly civil
conflict.
Further research on the topic can be done collecting data on the size of the
military in the colony, and on the potential productivity gain in the colonial
economies. These data can be used to verify the results of the model.
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